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Abstract 
 
The twentieth century has aptly been referred to the century of the refugee.1 In the 
twentieth century, refugees became an important international problem which seriously 
affected relations between states and refugee issues continue to play an important part in 
international relations in the twenty-first century. The refugee crisis created by the Nazis 
in the 1930s was without precedent and the British government was unsure how to 
respond. British refugee policy was still in a formative stage and was therefore 
susceptible to outside influences. 
 
This dissertation aims to explain the key factors that drove British refugee policy in the 
period March 1938 to July 1940, and to evaluate their relative significance over time. I 
divided the period of study into three phases (March-September 1938, October 1938 to 
August 1939, September 1939 to July 1940), in order to explore how a range of factors 
varied in importance in a political and international environment that was rapidly 
changing. In considering how to respond to the refugee crisis, the British government was 
hugely influenced by concerns over its relations with other countries, especially 
Germany. There is little doubt that, during the entire period of this study, the primary 
influence on the formation and implementation of British refugee policy was the 
international situation. However, foreign policy did not by itself dictate the precise form 
taken by British refugee policy. The response of the British government was modulated 
by economic concerns, domestic political factors, humanitarianism, and by the habits, 
traditions and assumptions of British political culture. Some factors, like anti-Semitism 
became less important during the period of this study, while others like humanitarianism 
increased in importance.  
 
                                                 
1 T. Kushner and K. Knox, Refugees in an Age of Genocide (London, 1999), p. 1. 
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Preface 
 
In 1996, Hugo Gryn, a Holocaust survivor, stated that he believed future historians would 
call “the twentieth century not only the century of great wars, but also the century of the 
refugee”.1 Numerous refugee exoduses occurred throughout the twentieth century all 
over the globe. These include refugees caused by the two World Wars, people fleeing 
fascism, refugees from the Cold War and those seeking asylum towards the end of the 
century. Refugee movements are not new to the twentieth century, but as Clauden
mentions, “twentieth-century refugee movements significantly differ from earlier ones in 
this important respect: they attracted the attention of political leaders and became 
international issues.”
a Skran 
                                                
2 In the twentieth century, refugees became an important 
international problem which seriously affected relations between states and refugee issues 
continue to play an important part in international relations in the twenty-first century. 
“Despite the end of the Cold War”, as Claudena Skran comments, “the refugee issue 
shows no signs of disappearing”.3 By the end of 2006, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated the that total population of concern to it 
was 32.9 million persons with the global number of refugees 9.9 million persons, 
excluding the 4.4 million Palestinian refugees who fall under the mandate of the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East.4 According 
to UNHCR estimates, by the end of 2006 there were some 2.1 million Afghan refugees 
“accounting for one fifth of the global refugee population. Iraq was the second largest 
country of origin of refugees (1.5 million), followed by Sudan (686,000), Somalia 
(460,000), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (402,000), and Burundi (397,000).5 
Refugee issues are not simply problems calling for humanitarian concern. According to 
Gil Loescher: “They can be a potential threat to the social, economic, and political fabric 
of host states, and ultimately a threat to peace”.6 It is becoming evident, Loescher 
continues, that the notion that “refugee movements pose humanitarian problems marginal 
 
1 Quoted in T. Kushner and K. Knox, Refugees in an Age of Genocide (London, 1999), p. 1. 
2 C. Skran, Refugees in Inter-War Europe (Oxford, 1995), p. 13.  
3 Ibid., p. 1.  
4 UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook 2006 (Geneva, 2007), p. 7. 
5 Ibid., p. 8. 
6 G. Loescher, “Introduction: Refugees Issues in International Relations” in G. Loescher and L. Monahan, 
Refugees and International Relations (Oxford, 1989), p, 2. 
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to the central issues of war and peace, or that they are unique and isolated events, must be 
superseded by a serious consideration of refugee problems as an integral part of 
international politics and relations”.7 This view is becoming more accepted and refugee 
issues are being given greater consideration in international relations, domestic politics 
and in media coverage.   
 
1938-40 was an important period in the history of refugee movements. Sir Herbert 
Emerson, The League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Director of the 
Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, estimated in a report to the League of 
Nations Assembly in October 1939 that a total of 400,000 refugees had left Greater 
Germany since 1933.8 The British government had little experience dealing with the kind 
of refugee crisis generated by the Nazis. Refugee policy was still in a formative stage and 
was therefore susceptible to outside influences. During this period, British refugee policy 
underwent numerous changes in a very short period of time.  
 
This dissertation aims to explain the key factors that drove British refugee policy in the 
period March 1938 to July 1940, and to evaluate their relative significance over time. I 
divided the period of study into three phases (March-September 1938, October 1938 to 
August 1939, September 1939 to July 1940), in order to explore how a range of factors 
varied in importance in a political and international environment that was rapidly 
changing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 A. Sherman, Island Refuge (Essex, 1994), p. 270. 
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Chapter 1 
Background, context, historiography 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections and is intended to establish the historical and 
historiographical context. It will also discuss the primary sources used and establish a 
methodology and analytical framework. The first section, which discusses the historical 
background, will deal with Britain’s immigration policy in the first part of the twentieth 
century focusing on the four key pieces of legislation. Then it will give an overview of 
the chronological parameters of the study. The second section, which focuses on the 
historiography, will discuss both the wider literature on refugees as well as the specific 
historiography on refugees in Britain between 1938 and 1940. The third section will 
describe the key primary sources used by the main authors in this field as well as the 
sources used in this dissertation. 
 
 
Historical background 
 
The regulatory framework within which refugee issues were dealt with in the period 
1938-40 was formed by a series of four government measures enacted between 1905 and 
1920. This legislation remained in effect until after World War Two and controlled the 
immigration of refugees from Germany into Britain from 1933 to 1938. From 1826 to 
1905 there was effectively total freedom of immigration to Britain, and although several 
regulations were passed they were never enforced.9 In 1905 The Aliens Act was 
introduced, largely in response to anti-immigrant reaction which opposed large-scale 
immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe. This act introduced a system of regulating 
aliens at the ports. It subjected the majority of the poorest class of immigrants to 
inspection by immigration officers, but placed no fundamental obstacles in front of the 
majority of alien visitors.10 The Aliens Act of 1905 empowered immigration officers to 
                                                 
9 B. Wasserstein, “The British Government and the German immigration 1933-1945” in G. Hirschfeld, 
Exile in Great Britain (London, 1984), p. 63. 
10 L. London, Whitehall and the Jews 1933-1948 (Cambridge, 2000), p. 16. 
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deny entry to undesirables (such as the diseased, criminals, the insane) and if passengers 
could not establish that they were capable of supporting themselves and any dependents 
they were liable to be refused entry on the grounds of being undesirable immigrants.11 A 
limited concession for refugees was included in this Act as a result of concern that 
Britain’s tradition of granting asylum should not be forsaken. An exemption from refusal 
of leave to land was permitted on the grounds of poverty if immigrants could prove they 
faced “prosecution or punishment, on religious or political grounds or for an offence of a 
political character” or that they were fleeing from “persecution, involving danger of 
imprisonment or danger to life or limb, on account of religious belief”.12 This exception 
to the poverty test enabled many refugees who would otherwise have been refused entry 
to gain admission to Britain between 1906 and 1914. Nevertheless, this period saw a 
decrease in the numbers of aliens admitted to Britain; partly because of the deterrent 
effect of this new law.13  
 
In 1914, with the outbreak of World War One the government passed the Aliens 
Restriction Act. This Act required all aliens to register with the police, it imposed 
restrictions, and it gave the Home Secretary the right the exclude or deport anyone 
without appeal.14 Britain also implemented a policy of internment for enemy aliens and it 
is estimated that 40,000 of the 50,000 Germans in Britain were interned in 1914.15  
 
The third piece of government legislation, passed after the end of the war, was the Aliens 
Restriction Act of 1919. This was followed by the Aliens Order of 1920, the fourth 
government measure. These statutes provided, in addition to the restrictions of the 1914 
Act, that no alien could enter Britain, other than temporarily, without either a means of 
support or a Ministry of Labour permit, and there was to be no appeal against the Home 
Secretary’s decision.16 The exemption from a poverty test for refugees had disappeared 
                                                 
11 B. Wasserstein, “The British Government and the German immigration 1933-1945”, p. 64. 
12 Quoted in L. London, “British Immigration Control Procedures and Jewish Refugees 1933-1939” in W. 
Mosse, Second Chance: Two Centuries of German-Speaking Jews in the United Kingdom (Tübingen, 
1991), p. 488. 
13 London, Whitehall and the Jews, p. 17. 
14 B. Wasserstein, “The British Government and the German immigration 1933-1945”, p. 64. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid., p. 65. 
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and there was no right of asylum for refugees. No legal protection for refugees remained 
in the statute book; the only right was that of Britain to grant asylum when it saw fit. 
Nonetheless, as Louise London states, “in the rhetoric of debate on refugee questions, the 
tradition of asylum was accorded quasi-constitutional sanctity”.17  
 
The period 1933 to 1937 saw an increase in the numbers of refugees seeking asylum in 
Britain as refugees from Nazi Germany started to arrive in Britain as early as January 
1933. There were several issues that were extremely important during this period. The 
question of finance was regarded by the government as crucial because legislation 
detailed that no alien was allowed to enter Britain, other than temporarily, without either 
a means of support or a Ministry of Labour permit; this proved problematic since the 
Nazi regime stripped Jewish refugees of most of their wealth on emigration. As a result, 
the Jewish organisations such as Jews Temporary Shelter and Jewish Board of Deputies 
promised the British government they would finance the maintenance and emigration of 
refugees from Germany. This became known as the Jewish Guarantee and is examined in 
detail in chapter two. Another important issue was the duration of the refugees’ stay in 
Britain. The government frequently stressed that Britain was not a country of 
immigration or settlement but instead a country of temporary refuge and transit. 
According to a Foreign Office memorandum of 1938: “the United Kingdom is not of 
course an immigration country, being an old country which is highly industrialised, very 
densely populated and having serious unemployment problems of its own”.18 Both the 
British government and the refugee organisations believed the majority of refugees 
should reside in Britain for a short period of time, that is, their stay should be temporary 
and they should eventually re-emigrate to countries of permanent residence. From 1933 
to 1937, an estimated 8,000 refugees found refuge in Britain.19 Despite the increase in the 
numbers of refugees seeking asylum in Britain during this period, there was no more 
major legislation until 1938.  
 
                                                 
17 L. London, “British Immigration Control Procedures and Jewish Refugees 1933-1939”, p. 489. 
18 PRO FO 371/22530, 13 March 1938. 
19 Skran, p. 221. 
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The period March 1938 to July 1940 was a crucial period in the history of British refugee 
policy. Although the tradition of granting asylum to refugees was given quasi-
constitutional status, there was no legislation specially covering refugees prior to 1938. 
Instead, refugees were treated as immigrants or trans-migrants who were expected to re-
emigrate to countries of permanent settlement. For the first time in British history, the 
government during this period introduced legislation that specifically pertained to 
refugees. The government, however, was unsure how to deal with the unprecedented 
refugee crisis that had been provoked by events in Central Europe. Government policy to 
refugees underwent several significant modifications that affected the lives of thousands 
of refugees. Broadly speaking, it is possible to identify three distinct phases in the 
evolution of British refugee policy between March 1938 and July 1940. This dissertation 
will analyse each of these three phases in turn.  
 
The first phase began in March 1938 with the Anschluss with Austria and ended with the 
Munich Agreement of September 1938. During these six months, there was a significant 
increase in the number of refugees seeking asylum in Britain. This led to a review of 
refugee policy which resulted in the introduction of passports for German and Austrian 
refugees. The second phase of British refugee policy, which lasted from October 1938 to 
August 1939, was shaped by a series of international events: the annexation of the 
Sudetenland, “Kristallnacht” and the invasion of Bohemia and Moravia. The Munich 
Agreement and “Kristallnacht” caused further substantial increases in the number of 
refugees seeking asylum in Britain and led to the liberalisation of refugee policy. In 
November, the Cabinet decided to speed up and simplify immigration procedures for 
refugees and to expand Britain’s role as a temporary refuge. Then, with the invasion of 
Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939, national security became increasingly important. 
The third and final phase comprised the period from September 1939 to July 1940. The 
outbreak of the Second World War and the catastrophic defeats that followed Hitler’s 
invasion of Western Europe in April 1940 initiated a number of changes in refugee 
policy. These include the implementation of wholesale internment which began in May 
1940 and the deportation of some 8,000 internees to Canada and Australia. This third 
phase in the evolution of British refugee policy—the last dealt with in this dissertation—
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ends in July 1940 with the publication of a White Paper detailing categories allegeable 
for release from the internment camps. 
 
 
Historiography 
 
Despite the magnitude of the refugee issue, academics have been slow to respond to the 
importance of refugees and the work that has been done has “for the most part … existed 
on the periphery [rather than] the mainstream of academic enterprise”.20 Until recently 
little attempt has been made to understand refugee issues within international and 
national political contexts. Gil Loescher believes that in international relations literature 
and in studies of refugees, the relationships between refugees and foreign policy have 
been and remain little explored. He continues that: 
 little systematic research has been done into either the political causes of different 
 types of refugee movements or the political, strategic, and economic factors that 
 determine the policy responses of states to refugee crises. Nor has any 
 comprehensive theoretical framework been developed to explain and compare 
 government policies, to analyse the policy-making process in individual countries, 
 or to assess the relationship between international norms and national compliance 
 with these legal standards.21  
 
With that said, “refugee studies” are beginning to develop into a more mainstream area in 
history, with well known and highly regarded historians, such as Claudena Skran22, 
David Cesarani23, Michael Marrus24 and Tony Kushner25 tackling the subject. The fall of 
the Soviet Union and the re-emergence of refugee flows within Europe in the 1990s 
fostered a revival of historical interest in the subject of refugees.26 In particular, the 
collapse of the Yugoslav federation and the ensuing claims of independence by the 
republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia, caused the displacement of some 
                                                 
20 Quoted in Kushner and Knox, Refugees in an Age of Genocide, p.3.  
21 G. Loescher, “Introduction: Refugees Issues in International Relations” p. 4. 
22 Refugees in Inter-War Europe 
23 (Ed.) The Making of Modern Anglo-Jewry (Oxford, 1990), (Ed.) The Internment of Aliens in Twentieth 
Century Britain (London, 1993), (Ed.) ‘Bystanders’ and the Holocaust (London, 2002). 
24 The Unwanted (Philadelphia, 2002) 
25 Refugees in an Age of Genocide  
26 A. Zolberg, “Foreword” in M. Marrus, The Unwanted, p. xii. 
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two million people and led to ethnic cleansing. Tony Kushner and Katharine Knox 
discuss how some refugees “fled under their own initiative, while others left with the 
assistance of the UNHCR which attempted to coordinate international ‘burden sharing’ in 
Europe’s new and massive refugee crisis.”27 Studying previous refugee movements can 
also assist in the understanding of contemporary refugee problems.28  
 
Prior to the opening of governmental archives many contemporaries wrote their accounts 
of immigration into Britain. As early as 1936 Norman Bentwich wrote The Refugees from 
Germany, April 1933 to December 1935 which covered the first wave of arrivals. He 
followed this up with They Found Refuge, published in 1956, which was an account of 
British Jews work for the victims of Nazism. Norman Bentwich was an attorney-general 
in Palestine and a professor of international relations at the Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem. When the Nazi persecutions began, he became “one of the foremost fighters 
for the rescue of the oppressed. He travelled to all countries, pleading with governments 
and investigating possible places of refuge.”29 Bentwich became the director of both the 
League of Nations High Commission for Refugees from Germany (1933-35) and of the 
Council for German Jewry.30 Other contemporaries also wrote accounts on this subject, 
including You and the Refugee by Norman Angell and Dorothy Frances Buxton, 
published in 1939. You and the Refugee discuses the moral and economic issues 
pertaining to the refugee problem. The authors believed that Britain was “pursuing a 
policy which makes the solution of the refugee problem as a whole impossible, and 
renders private charity impotent to do more than touch its merest fringe”31. Norman 
Angell was an author, Labour MP and recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize.32 Dorothy 
Buxton was a humanitarian and social activist. During the 1930s she collected and 
circulated reports on Nazi concentration camps that she collected from refugees she 
helped only to have the Foreign Office “pigeon-hole” them until after the outbreak of 
war. She made an attempt to see Herman Goering in 1935 “to confront him with the 
                                                 
27 T. Kushner and K. Knox, p. 355. 
28 Skran, p. 9. 
29 H. Matthew and B. Harrison (eds.) Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004), vol. 5,  p. 
311. 
30 Ibid. 
31 N. Angell and D. Buxton, You and the Refugee (Harmondsworth, 1939), p. 12. 
32 H. Matthew and B. Harrison, vol. 2, pp. 150-1. 
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abominations being perpetrated and so shame him out of Nazism. He of course only 
started shouting at her in fury”.33 Sir John Hope Simpson wrote The Refugee Problem, 
published in 1939, which was the result of a survey of the refugee question undertaken 
under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. He followed this up 
with Refugees: A Review of the Situation since September 1938, published in 1939. 
Simpson was a Liberal MP, and vice-president of the Refugee Settlement Commission (a 
body established in Athens to settle Greek refugees after the Graeco-Turkish war). He 
subsequently wrote a report, which became known as the Hope Simpson report, on land 
settlement in Palestine.34 The Internment of Aliens by François Lafitte and Anderson’s 
Prisoners by “Judex” were critical accounts of the internment and deportation policies. 
Yvonne Kapp and Margaret Mynatt wrote British Policy and the Refugees 1933-1941. 
These works were written and published between 1939 and 1941 (British Policy and the 
Refugees 1933-1941 was written in 1940 but not published until 1997). Apart from 
Bentwich, these works are critical of Britain’s immigration policy and of the British 
government’s handling of the refugee crisis. Their purpose seems to have been 
educational and political. Angell and Buxton, for example, appealed for countries to 
change their alien admission policy to meet the crisis of refugees who were fighting the 
battles of democracies in Central Europe. 
 
Government archives on this subject were opened for research purposes in the 1970s, 
which is when the in-depth historical investigation of refugees and immigration into 
Britain began. Island Refuge (1973) by A. J. Sherman was the first historical account of 
refugees who entered Britain which utilised the newly-opened governmental records. It 
describes Britain’s response to the exodus of refugees from the Third Reich between the 
years 1933 and 1939. Sherman contends that Britain was not ungenerous towards the 
refugees during this period. This work was followed by numerous books and articles 
which have studied the British immigration policy and the refugee crisis from a variety of 
angles. One of the most important was Bernard Wasserstein’s Britain and the Jews of 
Europe 1939-1945. Wasserstein begins his study where Sherman’s finishes and describes 
                                                 
33 Ibid., p. 283. 
34 Ibid., p. 702. 
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and explains the policy of the British government towards the Jews from Europe during 
World War Two. Wasserstein is more critical of British refugee policy that Sherman. 
Other influential scholars who have written on this topic include Tony Kushner35, David 
Cesarani, William Rubinstein36, Louise London37, Tommie Sjöberg38 and Claudena 
Skran. Louise London is the author of Whitehall and the Jews 1933-1948 and several 
articles on British refugee policy in the 1930s and 1940s. In Whitehall and the Jews, 
London argues that British politicians placed, what they believed to be, the national 
interest above humanitarian concerns when formulating refugee policy. She makes a case 
that Britain could have saved many more Jews from Nazi genocide, without undermining 
British national interests. On the other hand, Claudena Skran’s book examines the history 
of organised international efforts for refugees during the interwar period. She uses the 
“regime theory” approach when looking at refugees during this period. She defines a 
regime as “the formal or informal arrangements created by states to deal with a particular 
issue”.39 Skran argues that during the inter-war period, refugee assistance constituted a 
regime. When seen from this perspective, refugee aid was not only more significant and 
substantial than is generally appreciated, but it also helped shape global assistance to 
refugees today.  
 
An important question that divides historians of the refugee issue in this period is whether 
the British government did enough to help the victims of Nazi aggression. The debate 
about this question has focused on the harshness or otherwise of British immigration 
policy, the British mandate over Palestine and proposals to rescue refugees from 
occupied Europe and Nazi concentration camps. On the one hand, historians such as 
Sherman and Rubinstein are broadly sympathetic to the British government, although 
they make specific criticisms. They believe that British refugee policy was relatively 
                                                 
35 The Persistence of Prejudice (Manchester, 1989), The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination (Oxford, 
1994), Refugees in an Age of Genocide. 
36 The Myth of Rescue (London, 1997). 
37 “British Government Policy and Jewish Refugees 1933-45” Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 23, no. 4 (1989), 
“Jewish Refugees, Anglo-Jewry and British Government Policy, 1930-1940” in D. Cesarani, The Making of 
Modern Anglo-Jewry (Oxford, 1990), “British Immigration Control Procedures and Jewish Refugees”, 
“British reactions to the Jewish flight from Europe” in P. Catterall, Britain and the Threat to Stability in 
Europe, 1918-45 (London, 1993), Whitehall and the Jews 1933-1948. 
38 The Powers and the Persecuted (Lund, 1991). 
39 Skran, p. 7. 
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generous and that the British government responded as effectively as it could to a 
difficult problem. Given the fact that Britain was enduring a serious depression and 
unemployment was high, the immigration controls imposed by the British government 
were not unreasonable. In the wake of “Kristallnacht”, when the murderous intent of the 
Nazis became apparent, the British government duly relaxed refugee policies.  
 
Other scholars take a much more critical view of Britain’s immigration policy during the 
period and of her handling of the refugee crisis.  Historians in this group include: Bernard 
Wasserstein, Louise London, Tony Kushner, Peter and Leni Gillman40, and Ronald 
Stent41. They believe Britain did not view the refugee crisis in a humanitarian light, but 
through the eyes of self-interest. More could have been done in trying to assist Jews and 
other refugees fleeing from Nazi Germany and also to permit survivors of the Holocaust 
to enter Britain after the end of World War Two.  
 
The approach of the majority of these authors is largely narrative and descriptive, and 
does not focus enough on the underlying factors that drove the formation and 
implementation of refugee policy. In the introduction to Whitehall and the Jews, Louise 
London notes that the “leading scholarly monographs concentrate on the content of the 
British policy towards the Jews, to the comparative neglect of both the context of that 
policy and its administration”.42 Whitehall and the Jews is the most comprehensive 
examination of British refugee policy (from 1933 to 1948) to date. It places a far greater 
emphasis on the context in which the policy was formulated and implemented than 
previous studies have done. London focuses on the interplay between the various 
ministries, government departments, and officials involved in the evolution of refugee 
policy. Another aspect in historiography which is problematic is that by focusing so much 
on the question of whether Britain did enough for the Jews, the historiography rather 
loses sight of the domestic context of British refugee policy and its administration. While 
London’s work places a far greater emphasis on the context in which the policy was 
                                                 
40 ‘Collar the Lot!’ (London, 1980). 
41 A Bespattered Page? (London, 1980). 
42 London, Whitehall and the Jews, p. 3. 
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formulated and implemented it neglects the role of issues that are not regarded as 
political.  
 
I am not going to engage with the question of whether Britain did enough to help 
refugees during this period, but instead I am going to try and identify and analyse the 
underlying dynamic. The chronological period this study covers is concise for the reason 
that it allows me to examine in depth the factors that influenced refugee policy, how the 
influence changed during the period, and how the factors interacted with one another.  
 
The factors I intend to explore can be divided into internal and external factors. Internal 
factors include fears about the impact of refugees on the economic situation, anti-
Semitism, the influence of the press, general population, lobbyists, and voluntary 
organisations, and humanitarian considerations. External factors encompass the 
international situation and Britain’s relations with other countries. 
 
 
Primary sources for the study of British refugee policy, 1938-40 
 
In this dissertation I have used a variety of primary sources, including government 
documents, parliamentary debates, contemporary newspapers and magazines and 
pamphlets, as well as documents from the Mass-Observation Archival at the University 
of Sussex. The government documents I have examined are housed at the Public Record 
Office in Kew and pertain to the Home Office and the Foreign Office. All of the 
documents I am using from the Home Office come from the file HO 213 Home Office: 
Aliens Department: General (GEN) Files and Aliens Naturalisation and Nationality (ALN 
and NTY Symbol series) Files, 1920-61. They cover numerous different topics including 
the Co-ordinating Committee for Refugees, the influx of Jewish refugees from Germany 
and Austria to the UK, and the international convention concerning status of refugees 
from Germany 1938. The documents from the Foreign Office come from the file FO 371 
Foreign Office – General Correspondence: Political, 1906-60. Like the Home Office files 
they cover numerous aspects of the refugee issue dealt with by the Foreign Office 
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including the attitude of various countries to the refugee problem, international assistance 
to refugees and the conventions regarding status of refugees. When using these 
documents it is important to establish the original purpose of the document and who they 
were written for, for instance whether they were written for a superior or for another 
department, as this will have an impact on what was written and the way it was written.  
 
Another important primary source is furnished by the House of Commons Parliamentary 
Debates (Hansard). These debates provide a valuable source of information about what 
was happening in the House of Commons, about the issues that were discussed regularly 
and any discontent among the political parties or individual members of parliament. 
Something historians have to be cautious about when using these debates is that in 
parliament politicians speak for effect, with a political purpose in mind; therefore 
historians have to be careful about attributing private attitudes to politicians on the basis 
of parliamentary statements.    
 
Another collection of primary sources comes from the Mass-Observation Archive. “The 
Archive results from the work of the social research organisation, Mass Observation. This 
organisation was founded in 1937 by three young men, who aimed to create an 
“anthropology of ourselves”. They recruited a team of observers and a panel of volunteer 
writers to study the everyday lives of ordinary people in Britain.”43 The files from this 
archive contain surveys and opinion polls about refugees and aliens and include 
information on attitudes of the population to other nationalities, public feeling about 
aliens and North London refugees. This is a great source of information regarding the 
attitudes of the public to certain issues, but historians have to be aware that the questions 
asked can be crude and “loaded”. 
 
The London Times and The Manchester Guardian are the contemporary newspapers I 
have examined and The Economist is the contemporary magazine. These sources contain 
hundred of articles and they cover every aspect of the refugee question, and aliens and 
                                                 
43 http://www.massobs.org.uk/a_brief_history.htm 20/01/08. 
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internment. The newspapers contain many letters to the editor from refugees and 
internees, members of the public, and members of parliament. There are a number of 
disadvantages of using newspapers as a primary source, these include that newspapers 
can be used for propaganda purposes, that they can feature articles which are exaggerated 
and sensationalist and they can face censorship. 
 
Other contemporary publications have also provided a large amount of valuable 
information. The Refugee Problem by Sir John Hope Simpson44 contains the results of a 
survey of the refugee question which was undertaken under the auspices of the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs. The Refugee Problem explains the situation in countries 
of origin and reasons for the refugee problem there, details the specific private 
organisations that help refugees and the organisations’ aims, and describes the 
international assistance offered to refugees by the League of Nations’ organisations or 
agencies accredited by the League of Nations. This volume also describes how refugees 
fair in regards to both international and municipal law and it discusses the attitudes and 
practices of governments in countries of asylum. This volume also explains the existing 
and the potential problem and offers solutions, both immediate and long term. In addition 
it contains useful appendixes, including the 1933 and 1938 conventions. François 
Lafitte’s The Internment of Aliens provides an in depth account of the government’s 
policy and implementation of internment. Norman Angell and Dorothy Buxton discuss in 
You and the Refugee the moral and economic issues linked to the refugee problem. It 
focuses on issues like where a bad refugee policy will lead Britain, the problem in human 
terms, the economics of freer migration, and what British policy is and what it might be. 
These are just three examples of the numerous works that provide an insight into the 
thoughts of contemporary experts on a range of issues pertaining to refugees. A 
shortcoming of contemporary publications is that the authors often have an agenda when 
writing pieces and therefore their work can be biased.  
 
There are several issues with which I would have liked to have dealt, but on which I was 
able to find little material. Although there is a lot of information about the experiences 
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refugees faced in the internment camps and when they were deported, the conditions 
encountered by refugees in Britain prior to internment are not discussed in either the 
primary or secondary sources. While there is a lot of data about the fund established for 
Czech refugees and the British Committee for Refugees from Czechoslovakia, I could 
find little additional information about these refugees. The secondary sources do not have 
much to say about the “special” tribunals established to deal with these refugees and also 
about whether they were interned like German and Austrian refugees. Likewise, the 
majority of the secondary sources do not focus on what the political parties had to say 
about the refugee issue. Whether, for instance, it caused debate between the parties or if it 
was a matter that crossed party lines. One exception to this is Island Refuge by A. J. 
Sherman, which discusses the response of the Labour Party to the refugee issue, but 
which says little about the views and policies of the other main parties.45 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Refugee issues have played an important part in international relations in the twentieth 
century and will continue to have a significant role in domestic politics and foreign 
affairs in the twenty-first century. 1938-40 was a crucial period both internationally in 
regards to refugees as well as in the evolution and implementation of British refugee 
policy. The historiography which has until recently remained rather neglected and 
marginalised is expanding and becoming more mainstream. However, this historiography 
has so far been constrained by the overwhelming focus on British “guilt” as well as the 
narrative and descriptive approach of historians. In this dissertation I shall attempt to 
move beyond such constraints in order to identify and analyse the underlying geological 
forces that shaped the topography of British refugee policy during this key period. 
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Chapter 2 
Conflicting forces 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the key factors that drove British refugee policy 
in the period between the Anschluss with Austria in March 1938 and the Munich 
Agreement of September 1938. I shall also attempt to evaluate the relative importance of 
these factors in shaping the formation and implementation of British refugee policy 
during the period in question. To this end, I shall look in turn at the impact on refugee 
policy of international relations, domestic political factors, economic issues and 
humanitarian considerations.  
 
 
International relations: Germany  
 
The single most important foreign policy objective of the British government in 1938 was 
to achieve a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Central Europe that had been provoked by 
the aggressive behaviour of Nazi Germany. In the belief that war with Germany should 
be avoided at almost any price, the British were willing to make numerous concessions to 
Germany in the hope of appeasing her and persuading her to honour her international 
agreements. Appeasement naturally had a huge impact on the formation and 
implementation of British refugee policy, for it was above all the Nazi government which 
had created the refugee crisis in the first place.46 Immediately after their assumption of 
power in 1933, the Nazis launched their first wave of persecutions, the primary victims of 
which were the Communists, and Social Democrats. From the very beginning, however, 
people were also persecuted because they were considered to be racially undesirable or 
because they had unusual sexual or social habits that differed from the norm. According 
to Wolfgang Benz, the Nationalist Socialist state was “most merciless in its 
discrimination and persecution of minorities on the basis of its race ideology, its primary 
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target being the Jews.”47 In April 1933, the Nazi government passed its first piece of 
discriminatory legislation against the Jews. The “Act for the Restoration of a Professional 
Civil Service” was a professional ban placed on Jews in the public service. 
“Complementary to the ‘Act for the Restoration of a Professional Civil Service’, the 
‘Aryan paragraphs’ served as a reason to exclude Jews from all areas of life”.48 In 
September 1935, the “Nuremberg Laws” were passed. These laws degraded German 
Jews to inhabitants with reduced rights. This was followed by the “Act for the Protection 
of German Blood and German Honour” which forbade marriages between Jews and 
Aryans and made sexual relations between the two a punishable offence.49 These forms 
of persecution made life increasingly difficult for Jews and non-Aryans in Germany and 
led many to believe that their only hope of a better life lay in emigration. Many of the 
people leaving Germany wanted to emigrate either to Britain itself or through Britain on 
their way to the United States or Palestine. This created a problem for the British 
government.  
 
British refugee policy was formulated within the context of overall foreign policy toward 
Germany, but the relationship between overall foreign policy and refugee policy, though 
important, was not straightforward. Britain’s desire not to antagonise Germany co-existed 
with her distrust of Nazism and hostility towards it ideologically. Furthermore, the British 
government considered the discrimination and harassment of Jews as an obstacle to 
Anglo-German relations, but Chamberlain and his colleges did not wish to dwell on this 
fact in public.50  
 
Germany, to a degree, did not want to antagonise Britain either. The Nationalist Socialist 
Regime initially wanted a good relationship with Britain and tried to secure Britain’s 
goodwill. Hitler’s primary goals, however, were to implement his racial agenda at the 
same time as pursuing his expansionist foreign policy agenda, but he hoped to achieve 
these goals without a confrontation with Britain. Hitler believed an alliance with Britain 
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would give him the freedom of movement he needed to carry out the first stage of 
German expansion into East Europe and Russia, his quest for Lebenstraum.51 
On the other hand, good relations with Britain, though desirable, were not the core of his 
foreign policy, in the same way that appeasement was to the British government. Thus 
German policy to the Jews was less influenced by concerns about relations with Britain 
than British policy to refugees was influenced by concerns about relations with Germany; 
the Anglo-German relationship vis-à-vis refugees was asymmetrical.   
 
Consequently, British refugee policy was pulled in two directions. On the one hand, 
Britain was determined to limit official criticism on issues relating to Germany’s internal 
affairs. For example when Lord Baldwin made a public appeal on behalf of German Jews 
in 1938, a Foreign Office document expressed concern that his appeal “shall not be 
capable of being represented as an attack on the Nazi regime”.52 Further on in the same 
document it was noted that: “There is no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of other 
countries.”53 Some officials even believed that criticism of Germany’s treatment of Jews 
could in fact lead to still greater persecution.54 On the other hand, the persecution of Jews 
and non-Aryans by the Nazi Regime was an issue that the British government could not 
be seen to condone. The same Foreign Office official who fretted about the impact of 
Lord Baldwin’s appeal also noted that “the human suffering and misery that has been 
created by the unquestionably brutal treatment of men, women and children, whose only 
fault is membership of a particular race, is a matter of concern to all who value moral 
standards of conduct in human relationships.”55 
 
The British government responded to the refugee crisis through diplomatic channels but 
also at the level of its internal refugee policy. At the diplomatic level, the British 
government took the position that it was the Germans who should bear the prime 
responsibility for finding a solution to the crisis. Since it was the German government 
that had created the refugee problem in the first place, Germany needed to play a central 
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role in resolving the crisis. The British government believed that it was imperative that it 
was seen to be taking a firm line with the German government rather than giving in to 
Nazi pressure by admitting destitute refugees.56 The situation was exacerbated by the fact 
that Germany stripped refugees of most of their wealth on emigration from Germany so 
that these refugees arrived at countries of asylum penniless. The Foreign Office believed 
that since the Nationalist Socialist Regime was so determined to get rid of the Jews it 
would be prepared to make some concessions to expedite their departure.57 Germany, it 
was hoped, could thus be pressured into letting the Jews depart with sufficient means to 
fund their own emigration and the cost of supporting themselves in the host country.58  
 
Another possible way of resolving the refugee crisis was through negotiations with other 
states, but the British government was reluctant to enter into any international 
commitments vis-à-vis the refugees. This was because “officials and ministers were 
united in the determination that Britain would not be dictated to by any external force—
whether it be a foreign government, an international organisation or the sheer pressure of 
the refugee exodus—as to the numbers or the types of refugees it would admit or the 
terms on which it would accept them”.59 However, British representatives did attend the 
Evian Conference, which was convened on the initiative of President Roosevelt to deal 
with the refugee problem. Convening at Evian-les-Bains in France in July 1938, the 
Evian Conference was attended by delegates from thirty-two countries, including Britain, 
Germany, the USA, France, Canada, Australia, Switzerland, Argentina, and Brazil. The 
Evian conference was viewed as unsuccessful because it failed to gain any “practical 
offers from any nation to take any large number of refugees”.60 The main positive result 
of the conference was the establishment of the permanent Intergovernmental Committee 
on Refugees (IGCR). Its brief was to use diplomatic pressure to persuade the German 
government to contribute to the cost of expelling its Jews by allowing emigrants to depart 
with at least some of their wealth. The objective was to achieve orderly migration in 
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place of a chaotic exodus.61 The British government entered the IGCR only with 
reluctance, and it sought to limit the scope of international action on the refugee problem 
for fear that it might reinforce Germany’s isolation from the international community or 
lead it to withdraw from the League of Nations.62 The IGCR failed to achieve tangible 
improvements in emigration opportunities.63  
 
Though the British government did not play a particularly constructive role at Evian, the 
main reason why negotiations failed was the hard line stance taken by the Nazi 
government. Though the Germans would on balance have preferred a good relationship 
with Britain, they were determined to carry though their racial policies regardless of what 
the British, or any other government, had to say on the matter. In other words, ideology 
was more important to the Nazis than placating the British. Britain, for her part, was 
growing more concerned about aspects of German policy (especially the persecution of 
Jews and non-Aryans) that she could not be seen to condone and to which she could no 
longer turn a blind eye. However, the fact that the British government was prepared to 
accept refugees lacking independent means of support, who would be largely dependent 
on charity, reduced the pressure on Germany to cooperate with the British over letting 
Jews depart with enough capital if it wished to achieve Jewish emigration.64 In the 
context of Anglo-German relations in general, the policy of admitting destitute refugees 
can be seen as part of the British policy of subordinating the refugee issue to the larger 
policy of appeasement. The British were reluctant to take too hard a line on the refugee 
issue least it jeopardise the policy of appeasement as a whole. The Germans wanted good 
relations with Britain but regarded the “Jewish Question” as so important that they would 
carry through the expulsions even if that meant jeopardising their relationship with the 
British. The British, by contrast, wanted to resolve the refugee crisis, but not if it meant 
jeopardising their overall relationship with Nazi Germany.   
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In addition to responding to the refugee crisis at the diplomatic level, the British 
government also had to adapt its refugee policy to cope with the substantial increase in 
the number of refugees arriving from Germany and Austria. During this period, March 
1938 to September 1938, Britain’s refugee policy was quite restrictive. At the beginning 
of March 1938 the Home Office started to review the refugee policy and in particular its 
stance on passports for Germans and Austrians. The existing system of control was 
believed to be inadequate because there were increasing numbers of Germans admitted as 
visitors who would later apply to remain as refugees and it would become difficult for the 
authorities to get rid of them. It was believed the way to stop or at least check the flood 
was to prevent potential refugees from getting to Britain at all. Reinstating the visa 
system for Germans and Austrians would make it possible to select immigrants “at 
leisure and in advance”.65 Home Office officials initially did not consider the 
introduction of visas to be the answer and instead thought it would be better to strengthe
control at the ports. Germany’s annexation of Austria proved to be a turning point. On 1
March 1938 the Austrian state collapsed and the following morning the Jewish re
organisations told the government that they could no longer automatically guarantee 
cover for all new refugees. This threw the Home Office’s system of control “off balance”. 
The Jewish organisations stated they could only guarantee newly admitted refugees if 
they were cleared by the organisation in advance. This meant future refugees risked 
becoming a charge on public funds. The Home Office now resolved that visas were 
needed to keep the numbers of Germans and Austrians, and especially stateless refugees, 
in check. The new procedure came into action on 2 May 1938 for Austrians and 21 May 
1938 for Germans. These new procedures achieved greater control but at the price of 
efficiency. The burden of casework became unmanageable and major delays were 
inevitable.
n 
1 
fugee 
                                                
66 This shows the importance of a change in the international situation in 
bringing about a change in the immigration policy. The change in British policy was 
provoked by the actions of the German government, but the precise nature of the British 
response was determined—at the diplomatic level—by Britain’s reluctance to challenge 
 
65 London, “British Immigration Control Procedures and Jewish Refugees”, p. 500. 
66 Ibid., p. 504. 
  21  
German policy, and at the level of domestic refugee policy by the pressing concern with 
cost.   
 
During this period the British government employed a policy of appeasement towards 
Germany. This involved the British making numerous concessions to Germany in the 
hope of appeasing her and persuading her to honour her international agreements but 
Britain’s desire not to antagonise Germany co-existed with her distrust of Nazism and 
hostility towards it ideologically. The British government also considered the 
discrimination and harassment of Jews as an obstacle to Anglo-German relations, but 
they did not wish to exaggerate this in public. The policy of appeasement had a 
significant impact on the way the British government dealt with the refugee problem. The 
British government was extremely reluctant to criticise either Germany’s internal affairs 
or her treatment of Jews and non-Aryans. Officials were also unwilling to enter in to any 
international agreements that would reinforce Germany’s isolation from the international 
community. As a result of appeasement, British policy to refugees was reasonably severe 
and unsympathetic. Persecution of Jews and non-Aryans was not condemned as could 
have easily been done and the numbers of refugees admitted to Britain was insignificant.  
 
 
International relations: East-Central Europe 
 
During this period, March 1938 to September 1938, Britain did not place a high 
importance on her relations with the countries of East-Central Europe, such as Poland, 
Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. This was because she did not regard them as part of her 
traditional sphere of influence but instead part of the Franco-German sphere. 
Consequently political relations between Britain and East-Central Europe were low key. 
For most of the inter-war period Britain did not have a well-defined political strategy for 
this region but Britain did have some economic interests in this area. In contrast, these 
countries were extremely worried by the German threat and repeatedly tried to build 
alliances with both the British and the French, but London was not interested.  
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The British government was, however, concerned by the deteriorating situation of Jewish 
minorities in the states of East-Central Europe. All of these countries had introduced anti-
Semitic legislation in the inter-war period and German propaganda encouraged the 
persecution of Jews and non-Aryans. In Refugees: Anarchy or Organization? Dorothy 
Thompson, who is credited with motivating the Roosevelt administration to convene the 
Evian Conference, discussed the situation faced by millions in Central Europe.67 
Thompson believed there was a strong anti-Semitic feeling in Hungary that increased due 
to the strength of violent Nazi propaganda. Discriminatory anti-Jewish legislation was 
introduced modelled on Germany’s example.68 In Romania, Thompson credited the 
passionate anti-Semitism which flared up in the late 1930s to the “Iron Guard” the 
Romanian Fascist Group who she believed envied the Jews’ financial success. In 
addition, she argued the Romanian King Carol “does not make a secret of his conviction 
that there are too many Jews in Rumania and that the world should help him get rid of at 
least a few hundred thousand of them”.69  The British government was extremely worried 
about the threat of more refugees or as officials called them “potential” refugees 
originating from these countries. Walter Adams, general secretary of the Academic 
Assistance Council (Society for the Protection of Science and Learning) and secretary of 
the Survey of Refugee Problems, expressed concern over “ominous statements” made by 
the governments and officials in East-Central Europe concerning their desire to see a 
mass emigration of their Jewish populations. According to Adams: 
 Already Jews have begun to flee from Hungary and Poland. If Eastern Jewry 
 begins to move on any large scale, Europe will be faced with a refugee 
 catastrophe greater than any that has confronted it in modern history. This is the 
 essence of the German refugee problem; in itself it is a minor disaster, but in its 
 implications it is terrifying.70  
 
For Adams, the most worrying problem was not the thousands of existing refugees from 
Germany and Austria, but the millions of refugees that would result if governments in 
countries such as Poland and Hungary decided to emulate the Nazis. Germany had a 
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relatively small Jewish population, whereas East-Central Europe had a large percentage 
of Jews. In Hungary, after the re-annexations between 1938 and 1941, the Jewish 
population numbered over 800,00071, while in Poland there were some 3.5 million 
Jews.72 
 
In deciding how to respond to this situation the British government had to take account of 
several conflicting factors which sometimes pulled British policy in different directions. 
Because Britain regarded East-Central Europe as part of the Franco-German sphere of 
influence, the British government wanted France to take a leading role in guaranteeing 
the security of these states and acting as a counter-balance to Germany. Yet the British 
were also anxious to avoid antagonising the Germans by meddling in their sphere of 
influence. Nor did they want to give the impression that they were challenging German 
economic supremacy in East-Central Europe. On the other hand, the British government 
was worried that increasing German influence in the region would encourage countries 
such as Romania and Bulgaria to adopt harsher policies towards Jewish minorities, which 
in turn would be likely to exacerbate the refugee crisis. In The Refugee Problem (1939) 
Sir John Hope Simpson discussed how the German government’s policy of 
discrimination against its Jewish population had increased the difficulties of Jews in 
Eastern Europe. He continued that these Eastern European countries:  
 have seen the success and impunity with which Germany has carried through a 
 persecution of Jews which has included the substantial confiscation of their 
 property and of their employment. They have seen other countries both separately 
 and in co-operation assist this emigration of a section of the population arbitrarily 
 described as ‘undesirable’.73  
 
A further factor of which the British needed to take account was the belief that, if British 
refugee policy was too liberal, it would encourage these states to produce yet more 
refugees. The British government was worried that improving the situation of refugees 
coming from Germany and Austria would only encourage the states of East-Central 
Europe to escalate their persecution of Jewish minorities or even expel them. The key 
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issue for the British was whether or not to get involved in this region, and if Britain was 
to become involved, how should it proceed? The British government was faced with two 
alternatives. On the one hand, they could do nothing, and see East-Central Europe fall 
further under German influence which in turn would exacerbate the refugee crisis. 
Alternatively, if they did become involved it could antagonise the Germans for the sake 
of a region in which the British were not particularly interested.  
 
As a result of these deliberations, Britain developed a two-fold solution for dealing with 
this situation. Firstly, Britain refused to grant asylum for refugees coming from East-
Central Europe but sent them back to their country of origin.74 The British government 
did not believe these refugees suffered the same persecution as Jews and non-Aryans in 
Germany and saw nothing wrong with returning them to their countries of origin. It is 
significant that, in taking this position, the government was turning a deaf ear to the 
views of experts such as Dorothy Thompson and Walter Adams, both of whom argued 
that Jewish minorities in East-Central Europe were not substantially better off than the 
Jews and non-Aryans of Germany. Jews in East-Central Europe were generally much 
poorer than their fellow Jews in Germany; hunger, malnutrition and poverty were serious 
problems for them. Sir John Hope Simpson even regarded the situation in East-Central 
Europe as more serious than that faced by Jews in Austria and Germany. Though a 
number of Foreign Office officials shared Simpson's views, they also believed that any 
action to relieve the position of Jews in the region would provide a cue for further 
persecution.75 Secondly, Britain refused officially to acknowledge these states as refugee-
producing, thereby refusing to even accept there was a problem. For example, even 
though countries of East-Central Europe had not been invited to the Evian conference, 
Poland and Romania volunteered to attend as “refugee producer” countries and indicated 
their desire to assist the departure of their own Jewish populations.76 
 
During March to September 1938 Britain’s relations with East-Central Europe were not 
as important as Germany in influencing the evolution and implementation of refugee 
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policy. In any case, the British viewed refugee issues in Central Europe in the context of 
relations with Germany. It was Germany’s influence in this region that led to increased 
anti-Semitism and caused alarm, among British officials and refugee experts, about an 
increase in the numbers of refugees should persecution of Jews become too great or 
refugee policy towards German Jews be seen as too liberal.       
 
 
International relations: Palestine 
 
The British governed Palestine through the Mandate of Palestine from 1922 until 1948. 
After an economic slump in the 1920s, Palestine became a booming, lively place in the 
mid-1930s. During this period, Palestine had a Jewish population of about 400,000, about 
one-third of the total.77 Jewish immigration increased rapidly during this period and, in 
reaction to this, Palestinian Arabs launched a national strike in 1936. The purpose of this 
strike was to obtain a ban on further Jewish immigration, the prohibition of land transfers 
from Arabs to Jews and the replacement of the mandate by a national government. The 
strike gradually developed from intermittent acts of violence and sabotage into open 
revolt.78 Drastic regulations were introduced by the British to try to calm the situation. 
The mandatory authority began to reconsider its position on the issues of a Jewish 
national homeland and Jewish immigration to Palestine. From 1936 the British 
substantially reduced Jewish immigration to Palestine.79 Meanwhile in the summer of 
1937 a British Royal Commission, under Lord Peel, decided that the Arab claim of self-
government and the secure establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine were 
incompatible. It reported that the mandate was unworkable, and recommended the 
partition of Palestine into sovereign Arab and Jewish states.80 Jewish officials were 
divided on the merits of partition but the Arabs were strongly against partition and the 
publication of the Commission’s report led to a renewal of the Arab rebellion. The revolt 
represented a major challenge to British authority and diverted British military resources 
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on a large scale. The Arab Revolt continued into 1939. Although the British government 
had initially accepted the Peel Report’s findings, by 1938 its enthusiasm was beginning to 
wane. In November 1938, the British government released a White Paper in which a 
partition of Palestine was rejected.81  
 
Palestine’s link to the refugee crisis is that it was seen as a possible destination for Jewish 
refugees. Some officials believed that Jewish refugees saw Britain “less as the holder of 
the keys to Britain than as the guardian at the gates of Palestine.”82 Michael Marrus 
argues that up until the mid-1930s the problem for the Zionists was not immigration 
restrictions placed by the British but rather the shortage of Jews willing to go to Palestine. 
However, things had changed by the mid-1930s and just as the Jews needed to find a 
place of refuge and were beginning to press seriously on official immigration quotas, the 
British began to restrict immigration to Palestine.83   
  
In formulating their response, British policy makers were once again influenced by 
conflicting factors and faced a dilemma. On the one hand, the British were conscious of 
Arab discontent; they did not want to spark off a major conflict in with the Arab 
population or inflame the situation in Palestine and the rest of the Middle East. In an 
international atmosphere dominated by the fear of war and the need to prepare for it, the 
British repeatedly sought to pacify the Arabs in order to ensure their support should a war 
break out with Germany. One way to placate the Arabs was to restrict Jewish 
immigration to Palestine. Dorothy Thompson believed that the growing Arab opposition 
in Palestine meant that “all hopes of anything like Jewish mass emigration to Palestine 
have to be buried. We must face the fact that the fiery nationalism of the Arabs is 
growing more and more aggressive”.84 On the other hand, Palestine could provide a 
convenient asylum for Jewish refugees, especially since many Jews actually wanted to go 
there. In addition, the British had incurred obligations to the Jews by pledging to provide 
them with a national homeland in Palestine. The formation of a Jewish national homeland 
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was seen as especially crucial in light of the escalating persecution the Jews were facing 
in Germany and East-Central Europe. When the House of Commons discussed the 
situation in Palestine, one MP argued that: “The door of hope in Palestine must not be 
closed to these poor refugees. Wave upon wave of human misery is spreading from 
Central Europe in different directions, and it ought to be our duty to do what we can to 
help these sufferers”.85 The restrictive immigration policies the Western democracies had 
implemented during this period were seen as a further reason for the need of the Jews to 
have freer immigration to Palestine. The British were under pressure from Jews in Britain 
and from the United States to allow Palestine to become a major solution to the refugee 
problem. In May 1938, The Manchester Guardian reported on The Zionist Federation of 
Great Britain’s conference in which it “urged the Government to facilitate the entry into 
Palestine of Jewish refugees from Austria and expressed grave concern that a ‘policy of 
an arbitrary high-level of Jewish immigration into Palestine contrary to the mandate’ had 
taken the place of one of economic absorptive capacity”.86 British officials, however, 
argued that Palestine could not provide a home for a large number of refugees. At the 
Evian Conference, Lord Winterton—a member of the British delegation—quashed any 
suggestion that a solution to the refugee crisis could be found through large-scale 
immigration to Palestine.87  
 
Between March and September 1938, the issue of Palestine, like the issue of East-Central 
Europe, was overshadowed by the key issue of Germany. Palestine’s link to the refugee 
crisis was that it was seen as a possible destination for Jewish refugees but discontent and 
rebellion amongst the Arabs made the British reluctant to allow extensive Jewish 
immigration to Palestine. Although policy tilted towards the Arabs, the British response 
lacked clarity.  
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International Relations: America    
 
Anglo-American relations during the period March 1938 to September 1938 were 
initially cordial but improved steadily throughout the period of this study. Throughout the 
1920s and 1930s the American government pursued a policy of isolationism from 
Europe; the Act of 1937 was the high-water mark of isolationist neutrality legislation.88 
This Act tightened restrictions on American businesses and private individuals assisting 
belligerent states or parties. However, this policy of isolation and neutrality was slowly 
abandoned and relations between America and Britain became stronger. The British 
government knew that, if war should break out with Germany, Britain would need the 
support and resources of the United States. As a result, the British government was keen 
to develop the closest possible relationship with the Americans. As the situation in 
Europe deteriorated and war became more probable, the British government, and 
especially the Foreign Office, was watchful for signs that the isolationism of the 
Americans might be giving way to a readiness to become involved in European problems. 
Therefore, when President Roosevelt suggested the Evian Conference, the appealing 
possibility of improving Anglo-American relations led to the agreement within the 
British government that, “on political grounds alone” it was desirable to accept the 
American suggestion in principle.89 Whitehall believed the United States government’s 
departure from its policy of non-intervention in European matters should in itself be 
welcomed and encouraged. The primary objective of the Foreign Office in relation to the 
Evian proposal was maximising the opportunities it offered for developing closer Anglo-
American relations.90 British officials were reluctant to attend the Evian Conference but 
the British desire for positive relations with America and the need for American support 
in a potential war was more important to officials than the desire retain control over the 
refugee policy thus Britain attended the Evian Conference. 
  
The decision to participate in the Evian Conference was not the only example of how 
British refugee policy was influenced by the desire to please the Americans. The British 
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government, for instance, was not enthusiastic about joining the Intergovernmental 
Committee on Refugees, which it was believed would undermine the autonomy of British 
refugee policy. Officials and ministers were united in their belief that it was up to the 
British government to decide how many refugees it would admit and under what terms. 
British policy should not be dictated by any outside force, whether foreign government, 
international organisation or the sheer pressure of the refugee exodus.91 But because 
Roosevelt and the American government were in favour of the IGCR and because of the 
high priority given to developing Anglo-American relations, officials believed it was 
desirable to be involved in any international association on refugees with which the 
American government was associated.92 Consequently, the British government joined the 
IGCR but employed a policy of limited participation. As Louise London, states the 
British “government could not avoid playing an active role on the international stage if it 
wished to exert a restraining influence on the scope of any internationally agreed 
action”.93 Additionally, British policy makers intended to promote—through diplomacy 
and example—a greater commitment to helping refugees on the part of other nations, and 
in particular the United States.94 Although the main purpose of the Intergovernmental 
Committee on Refugees was to initiate negotiations with the Germans in order to 
improve emigration from Germany, it also ought to “promote Anglo-American 
cooperation and assist oppressed peoples”.95 Washington also frequently urged the 
British government to do more in helping refugees. The British government realised that 
the refugee issue could become a significant irritant in Anglo-American relations and this 
lent urgency to the search for places of settlement.96 The British government, aware of 
American criticism over restrictions on immigration to Palestine, looked within the 
British Empire for places of mass settlement.97 British Guiana, for example, was seen as 
a potential place for large-scale settlement and a Commission of Inquiry was held to
determine the validity of the area.
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 Between March and September 1938 Britain’s relations with America, while significant, 
were not as important as Britain’s relations with Germany in influencing the evolution 
and implementation of refugee policy. Britain became involved in international efforts to 
solve the refugee crisis with the aim of improving Anglo-American relations. This desire 
for good relations also led the British to seriously look for countries of large-scale 
settlement within the British Empire. There were, however, clear limits to the degree to 
which the British were prepared to bend their policies to please the Americans. For 
instance, the Americans were critical of the stance taken by the British government on the 
issue of Jewish emigration to Palestine. Yet the British resisted American pressure to 
adopt a policy that was more favourable to the Jews. 
 
 
Domestic factors: Fears about the impact of refugees on the economic situation 
 
The economic situation in the late 1930s was bad and Britain was only just beginning to 
emerge from recession. The global depression led to an economic and political crisis in 
Britain in 1931. There was mass unemployment, widespread poverty and a government 
deficit of ₤120,000,000 in 1931. 40 percent of the government deficit was directly due to 
unemployment payments.99 In 1932, at the peak of the depression, unemployment 
reached 3.4 million or 17 percent of the labour force.100 During this period the British 
government was still, however, committed to traditional ideas of the balancing books.  
Though the economic situation had improved by the later 1930s, it remained very fragile. 
As Clement Atlee, leader of the opposition, pointed out in the House of Commons in 
November 1938, unemployment in the previous year had actually increased  by 459,000 
to 1.8 million. Under these circumstances, the government was naturally anxious to avoid 
incurring any unnecessary expenses or doing anything that might jeopardise Britain's 
economic recovery.101  
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What made the financial situation of the government even more difficult was the fact that 
it was having to spend ever greater sums on rearmament. In 1938, the British government 
spent £254,977,438 on rearmament.102 As a result, the government was even less willing 
to spend public money on supporting refugees in Britain or on funding their re-
emigration. Instead, the government considered it was the duty of Jewish organisations to 
provide the funds for the financing of refugees. As Louise London argues, “Jews were 
seen as the responsibility, above all the financial responsibility, of the Jewish community 
rather than the British people”.103 As a result of this, Anglo-Jewish leaders played a 
crucial role in the development and implementation of British refugee policy during this 
period.    
 
When looking at the financial side of this issue, the British government was influenced 
by two fears. Firstly, the government was extremely worried that refugees would compete 
with Britons for jobs. As Sir John Hope Simpson stated: “England has a chronic post-war 
problem of native unemployment and all classes tend to fear competition in their labour 
market”.104 So great was the fear of the British population about competition for jobs that 
it continued even after the outbreak of war, when there was actually a shortage of labour. 
In April 1940, for example, a survey of public attitudes to aliens revealed that many 
people were worried that refugees would take British jobs. According to one respondent: 
"Well, I don't think they should take our jobs – we've a million unemployed."105  
 
As a result of such fears, the government decided that refugees would not be given 
general permission to work. If refugees wanted to seek employment they would need 
permission, in the form of a permit, granted after both the Ministry of Labour and the 
Home Office had approved their request. Permits would only be issued if this would not 
take a job from a British resident. There were some occupations open to refugees without 
a permit: domestic service, nursing, and a limited number of places in agriculture. 
Furthermore, special permission to work was available for persons who could supply a 
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kind of skill or trade that was not readily available in Britain. The limitations were very 
strict, and permission to follow trades and professions was usually subject to consultation 
with trade unions and professional associations.106 On the other hand, government 
ministers were keen to allow refugees who had already achieved distinction in their 
profession or field—those eminent in science, technology, art, music—to enter Britain 
and continue their careers. The fur trade was a prime example of this. British officials 
discreetly encouraged the selective immigration of refugees involved in this trade and, as 
was reported in Sir John Simpson’s survey: 
 there are about sixty refugee firms in Great Britain working as commission agents 
 and brokers which were formerly established in Leipzig or Berlin. In addition, 
 there are some three or four manufacturing furriers now in London employing 
 fifty or sixty workers who previously carried on business in Germany.107  
 
Louise London states that by 1939 the contribution of these refugees had transformed 
London into the most important fur market in the world.108 Britain’s refugee employment 
policy was designed to bestow benefits on Britain while displacing the financial risks 
onto the Jewish community.109  
 
The second economic fear the government faced when dealing with the refugee issue was 
that refugees would become a drain on public finances. This was heightened by the fact 
that the Nazis stripped Jewish refugees of up to 90 percent of their wealth on emigration 
from Germany. Thus refugees arrived in the countries of asylum penniless and destitute 
and in need of financial aid. Despite the enforced penury of refugees from Germany, the 
British government insisted that they receive no public money nor be allowed in any way 
to become a burden on the public purse. Public funds would not be spent on maintaining 
refugees in Britain, the costs of re-migration to countries of permanent settlement, or 
covering the administrative expenses of the charitable organisations. The Treasury 
maintained that government financial assistance to refugees was “almost out of the 
question” as it would create a precedent and might lead to more demands.110 
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Additionally, government officials were concerned that maintaining refugees out of 
public funds might provoke anti-alien feelings in the British population. 
 
There was much public debate about the economic aspects of this issue. One view was 
that Britain already had an unemployment problem without letting thousands of 
impoverished refugees enter Britain and compete on the labour market. There were 
already enough British people facing poverty and many believed that charity should 
begin at home. This was certainly a sentiment on which the British Union of Fascists was 
eager to capitalise. According to one BUF leaflet:  
 Why support a fund to give relief to aliens when poverty and unemployment are 
 rife in Britain? We have been asked in the past four years to support Abyssinians, 
 Basques, Chinese, Czechs, Austrians, Spaniards, and now Jews. MOSLEY SAYS 
 … CHARITY BEGINS AT HOME.111  
 
Some, on the other hand, argued that refugees could become an economic benefit and that 
it was a fallacy to regard immigrants as competitors in the labour market. Work, it was 
argued, was not a static lump to be parcelled out but was created by the additional 
numbers of consumers who would absorb consumer goods. Norman Angell and Dorothy 
Buxton wrote and published You and the Refugee about the economic side of the refugee 
issue in the hope of achieving a change in policy. They believed that British refugee 
policy was based on “the assumption that admission of more than a tiny number would 
have bad economic results, particularly in respect of unemployment. That assumption is 
pronounced fallacious by an overwhelming consensus of expert opinion”.112 They argued 
that greater freedom of migration in England and throughout the British Empire would 
add wealth to the country, improve the general economic situation and reduce 
unemployment.113 And they believed that the government should spend some state 
finances on the refugee problem. Even the small amount of about one or two percent of 
the money spent on armaments annually would provide much needed finances for the 
refugee problem.114 
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These financial dilemmas faced by the British government were partially resolved by the 
Jewish Guarantee. In 1933, when Hitler came to power, the Jewish organisations in 
Britain formally undertook that “all expense, whether in respect of temporary or 
permanent accommodation or maintenance will be borne by the Jewish community 
without ultimate charge to the State”.115 The Jewish Guarantee was designed to help 
refugees meet the condition of the Aliens Order to demonstrate that they could support 
themselves and their dependents.116 At the time of this pledge, the Jewish organisations 
estimated that between 3,000 and 4,000 refugees would immigrate to Britain.117 It should 
be noted that, in making this guarantee, the Chairman of the Jewish Refugees Committee, 
Otto Schiff, and his co-workers did not ask that refugees be permitted to work. The 
guarantee became the cornerstone of British refugee policy. In March 1938, with the 
German annexation of Austria, the Jewish organisations told the British government that 
they would only guarantee to finance refugees from Germany and Austria if they were 
cleared by the organisations in advance, that is, automatic cover for new refugee 
admissions could no longer continue. This did not mean the Jewish organisations stopped 
financing refugees; it simply meant that they wanted to approve the refugees they were to 
finance in advance. As we have seen, this prompted the government to introduce a system 
of visa controls.118 Since the Jewish organisations were financing the maintenance and 
remigration of German (and then Austrian) Jewish refugees in Britain, the immediate 
pressure was partially removed from the government to step up and fund the refugees in 
Britain during the period March to September 1938. 
 
Economic considerations had a significant impact on government policy to refugees at a 
time when the economic situation was bad and Britain was only just beginning to emerge 
from mass unemployment and recession. The guarantee by the Jewish organisations to 
cover all expenses of Jewish refugees meant refugees did not become a drain on public 
finances or compete with Britons for jobs. The Jewish Guarantee was a crucial aspect of 
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refugee policy during this period and it took the immediate pressure off the government 
to finance refugees and allow them to work which were both highly contentious issues. 
 
 
Domestic factors: Anti-Semitism 
 
When refugees were arriving at British ports or applying for visas at British consulates 
throughout Europe they were not asked to supply information on their religion or race. 
Refugees and immigrants were classed solely on their nationality—their race and religion 
were never recorded. In theory, the decision to grant or deny a petition for asylum took 
no account of the race or religion of the applicant. In the House of Commons debates, 
members of parliament regularly asked ministers questions like: how many Jewish 
refugees have been given asylum in Britain? What percentage of German refugees in 
Britain are Jewish? The ministers answering these questions repeatedly stated, as Samuel 
Hoare did on 2 May 1938, that it is “not policy to inquire as to religion or race of foreign 
person seeking permission to enter Britain”.119 Nevertheless, with Jews and non-Aryans 
being the main victims of the Nationalist Socialist Regime, it was inevitable that they 
would constitute the majority of people fleeing Nazi Germany and seeking asylum in 
other countries. In Britain it was estimated that 85-90 percent of refugees from Germany 
and Austria were Jewish or of Jewish descent.120 In reality the government and the wider 
political community were conscious of the Jewishness of the refugee problem. This 
explains why in House of Commons debates the race and religion of refugees was 
frequently mentioned.  
 
During the period in question there was an undercurrent of anti-Semitism in British 
society. Anti-Semitic feeling in Britain usually manifested itself in forms that fell short of 
political extremism and could co-exist with liberal convictions.121 This anti-Semitism 
was partly as a result of general distrust of foreigners. Tony Kushner believes that anti-
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Semitism in Britain was inseparable from anti-alien feeling.122 Although certain members 
of the government were anti-Semitic, it seems that the government in itself was not 
particularly anti-Semitic. The cabinet included at least one Jew, namely Leslie Hore-
Belisha, Secretary of State for War.123 Many government officials’ opinions of Judaism 
and Jewish people seem to be rather ambiguous. On the one hand, some Members of 
Parliament and Cabinet Ministers displayed or made anti-Semitic comments but were 
also proponents of a more liberal refugee policy and spoke out against the Nazi Regime. 
Harold Nicolson is a prime example of a MP with ambivalent feelings towards Jews. 
Nicolson was a member of Oswald Mosley’s “New Party” and edited his paper Action. It 
was not until 1932 that he severed ties with Mosley. As a National Labour MP, he sat on 
Eleanor Rathbone’s Refugees Committee and supported numerous refugees’ cases. Just a 
few days after he heard Anthony Eden’s statement on the extermination of Jews in 
Europe he told his son that a Jewish officer was stationed on the grounds of his home, but 
“recalling how but three days before I had stood in tribute to the martyred Jews of 
Poland, I was polite to Captain Rubinstein.”124 This comment implies Nicolson was not 
always “polite” to Jews.      
 
Instead, it was the fear of stimulating anti-Semitism in the general public that led officials 
to argue that the refugee policy should not be liberalised, and that there should be no 
increase in the numbers of refugees granted asylum in Britain. The secondary literature 
stresses that it was more the fear of anti-Semitism and the wish to avoid stimulating anti-
Semitism than anti-Semitism itself or anti-Semitic displays that caused the government 
extreme anxiety. Tony Kushner believes that it was fear of domestic anti-Semitism that 
“was at the bottom of the government’s refusal to allow anything other than a trickle of 
refugees into Britain.”125 Fear of increasing anti-Semitism was also used a reason for 
denying government aid to refugee organisations. Lord Winterton met with Mrs 
Ormerod, Secretary of the Co-ordinating Committee for Refugees, Mr Schiff, the 
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Chairman of the German Jewish Aid Committee, and Lord Bearsted, of the Council for 
German Jewry to discuss an application for government aid. Lord Winterton stated that 
the question of the government providing a grant for the Co-ordinating Committee was a 
“political impossibility”. He went on to say that if a:  
 grant were made Parliament would have to approve it, the matter would become 
 public, and there would be an immediate outcry from all anti-alien and anti-
 semitic elements in this country that the Government were subsidising the 
 admission of aliens at a time when there was widespread unemployment and 
 economic distress among our own people.126  
 
The fear of stoking anti-Semitism and ethnic strife was linked to the concern about 
political stability in Britain. Samuel Hoare, the Home Secretary, was concerned that mass 
immigration was likely to encourage the growth of fascism in Britain, necessitating 
careful selection of those who were allowed entry.127 Hoare’s concern was not was not 
without foundation, for the British Union of Fascists (BUF) had indeed been increasing in 
popularity. Anti-Semitism had the greatest impact in areas of Jewish concentration, like 
the East End of London, Manchester and Leeds, and the BUF did well in the London 
County Council elections in East London in 1937. The anti-Semitic campaigns of the 
BUF and other extreme right-wing organisations terrorised the Jewish population in 
places like the East End of London. The threat of violence was a major feature of Jewish 
life, particularly for working-class Jews, in the later 1930s.128 Politicians were concerned 
about the present reality of fascist violence, and about the possibility that the BUF could 
grow in popularity. In the event, however, the BUF turned not to be such a great threat. 
But we only know this with the benefit of hindsight. Given that the National Socialists 
had also started out as a violent and peripheral group, the concern of the British 
politicians about the BUF was reasonable. Jewish organisations were also worried about 
provoking anti-Semitism among the population. They produced and distributed to 
refugees in their care a pamphlet detailing “the sensitivity of the Anglo-Jewish 
community to the growth of anti-Semitic feeling which accompanied the influx of 
refugees”. Refugees were to start to learn earn English immediately, refrain from 
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speaking German or reading German newspapers in public, avoid criticising the 
government or the way things were done in Britain, and, lastly, not to make themselves 
conspicuous by their manner or dress.129    
 
The fear that the influx of Jews would stoke anti-Semitism had two main impacts on the 
refugee policy during this period. Firstly, it made the government even more reluctant to 
allow large numbers of refugees in to Britain. Louise London notes that the government 
and Anglo-Jewish leaders restricted the number of refugees admitted to Britain on the 
principle that this was essential to avoid stimulating anti-Semitism.130 Secondly, it made 
the government more selective of the refugees (and to be more precise the Jews) to whom 
it granted asylum. Several British policy makers believed that anti-Semitism was to some 
extent caused by the Jews themselves and if they were noticeably foreign and 
unassimilated the problem was greater.131 Officials were more likely to let Jews in to 
Britain if they thought they would be easily assimilated into the British population. This 
was one of the reasons why the government favoured pre-selection of refugees abroad.   
 
Fear of stimulating anti-Semitism had a considerable impact on the evolution and 
implementation of British policy towards refugees during this period. It is one of the 
factors that explain why policy to refugees was restrictive between March and September 
1938. The government was extremely anxious about stirring up anti-Semitism amongst 
the British population. As a result, the government limited the number and type of 
refugees to whom they granted asylum. Additionally, fear of stimulating anti-Semitism 
was a reason why the government would not finance refugees.    
 
 
Domestic factors: Influence of press, population, lobbyists, voluntary organisations 
 
There were numerous organisations that were concerned with the refugee situation and 
with helping refugees when they were in Britain. The most important distinction that 
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needs to be made is between Jewish and non-Jewish organisations. Jewish organisations 
concentrated their efforts and finance on Jewish refugees. There were other organisations, 
both religious and secular, that helped non-Jewish refugees. In the category of non-
Jewish refugees people labelled as ‘non-Aryans’ were also included. These were often 
Jews who had converted to Christianity. Some scholars have argued that it was easier for 
refugees to receive aid once they were in Britain if they were Jewish. These scholars 
believe that Christian groups did not do as much for non-Jewish refugees as Jewish 
organisations did for Jewish refugees and assistance for these and other Christian 
refugees was not well organised. As Claudena Skran notes:  
 it was not until January 1936 that an International Christian Committee for 
 German Refugees was formed. An exception to the generally slow approach on 
 the part of Christian organisations was that of the Society of Friends (Quakers). 
 Shortly after refugees began to flee Germany, the Quakers set up an Emergency 
 Committee to help all types of refugees, including Jews, Christians, Social 
 Democrats and Communists.132  
 
The Quakers were unique in that they tried to help all refugees and did not focus on a 
specific group or religion. 
 
Jewish organisations were seen by the British government as very important to solving 
the refugee crisis. There were numerous Jewish organisations in Britain that were 
involved in various aspects of the refugee situation both in Britain and overseas. Some of 
the most significant Jewish organisations were the Jews’ Temporary Shelter (JTS), the 
Jewish Refugees Committee (JRC), the Central British Fund for Germany Jewry (CBF) 
and the Jewish Board of Deputies. The Jews’ Temporary Shelter had been established in 
London’s East End prior to World War One. It specialised in helping Jewish immigrants 
from Europe as they passed through Britain on their way to permanent settlement 
overseas. Refugees were met at ports and railway stations by JTS representatives and 
were offered short-term accommodation and financial support.133 François Lafitte notes 
that when it became evident that the refugee problem caused by Nazi Germany was likely 
to increase and become a long-term problem, it was decided that it was sensible to 
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segregate the help for German refugees from the regular work of the JTS. Consequently, 
the Jewish Refugees Committee was created in March 1933 and Otto Schiff, president of 
the JTS, was its chairman.134 The Jewish Refugees Committee’s funds were provided by 
the Central British Fund for Germany Jewry which was established a few weeks later. 
The JRC’s activities were limited to helping refugees in Britain; it assumed the 
management of the refugee influx and underwrote its costs. Between 1938 and 1940 the 
JRC was known as the German Jewish Aid Committee. This was because of the idea that 
these people should not be regarded as refugees forever but in 1940 it reverted back to the 
JRC in order to avoid the word “German” which could provoke prejudice during the 
war.135 Otto Schiff believed “that a genuine refugee in need should be helped by the 
Committee without regard to the fact whether he or she was a member of the Jewish 
community, ‘confessionlos’, or baptized”. The Jewish organisations had larger funds than 
their Christian counterparts and were often called upon to help them.136 The JRC and its 
associated funding organisations were the most significant Jewish organisations involved 
in solving the refugee crisis in Britain. 
 
Other Jewish organisations in Britain focused their efforts on emigration. The Central 
British Fund for Germany Jewry, as opposed to the JRC, had a broad outlook which 
fostered reconstruction rather than relief. Assistance in Britain was only one of the CBF’s 
commitments and the sums allocated to the JRC were relatively small compared with 
large-scale expenditure on emigration to Palestine.137 The Council for Germany Jewry 
(CGJ) was another organisation that focused its efforts on permanent emigration overseas 
but in the case of the CGJ to places other than Palestine.138 The Board of Deputies of 
British Jews was the main organisation that represented organised Anglo-Jewry. It did 
not engage formally in refugee work but had links with all the Jewish refugee 
organisations. Board leaders preferred to represent Anglo-Jewry as a whole and for them 
the admission of refugees to Britain was an auxiliary aspect of the Nazi crisis.139 The 
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Jewish leaders intended that Britain’s role should be on the periphery, as a country of 
transit, and they gave a high priority to limiting the numbers of refugees in Britain.140 
 
The government wanted to have good relations with these voluntary organisations, for it 
saw them as crucial to the solution of the refugee crisis. British officials believed the 
Jewish organisations played a very important role because they not only financed Jewish 
refugees but provided practical administrative assistance, such as investigating visa 
applications and dealing with incoming correspondence, that government organisations 
could not deal with. Therefore, these organisations had a degree of leverage. But, 
although the government wanted the goodwill of these organisations, it was not prepared 
to grant them full autonomy in respect to dealing with the refugee situation. For example, 
the Jewish representatives asked the government to grant temporary asylum to all 
refugees coming from Germany in return for their pledge to finance and manage the 
influx of refugees. They asked that those refugees arriving at the ports should be admitted 
without distinction and that those already in Britain should be allowed to prolong their 
stay indefinitely. The government rejected these requests.141   
 
There was increasingly close cooperation between the Home Office and the voluntary 
organisations. In many cases government departments passed on to the voluntary 
organisations work that they did not have the time or staff to deal with. Louise London 
notes that the larger voluntary organisations “attained a quasi-official status, which 
reflected the scale of their operations and their ability to influence an individual’s 
immigration prospects.”142 However, there was the concern about confusion and 
overlapping between the numerous organisations dealing with refugee issues. So, in April 
1938, the Co-ordinating Committee for Refugees was established. This committee was 
formed at the initiative of the Home Office to form a link between the numerous refugee 
organisations. It was designed to “represent the collective interests of the refugee 
organisations vis-à-vis the British Government, especially in questions of residence, 
training facilities, and official approaches to Dominion, colonial or foreign governments 
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on emigration matters”.143 Due to the fact that these organisations wanted to keep the 
influence they held over the government, they initially tried to avoid constantly criticising 
refugee policy. However, the Co-ordinating Committee became increasingly critical of 
the Home Office. On 18 October 1938, the Co-ordinating Committee for Refugees 
addressed a memorandum to the Home Office stating: “in recent months it has been 
absolutely clear to all the bodies doing case work that there has been a complete 
breakdown, on the official side, of the policy of selected immigration through the 
approved voluntary organisations”.144 The Co-ordinating Committee warned that it could 
no longer perform its functions unless given a government grant – which the government 
said was out of the question.145 To solve this crisis the Co-ordinating Committee formally 
restricted the activities it undertook, leaving the government departments to take up these 
tasks. It further declared the committee could not take any responsibility for the refugees 
from Czechoslovakia.146 
 
It is important to mention a contradiction in the government policy. Policy clearly stated 
that a person’s race or religion was not important when deciding their claim on asylum. 
Statistics on refugees’ race and religion were not recorded. Alternatively, the pledge 
given by the Jewish organisations to finance and manage specifically the Jewish refugees 
in Britain was accepted by the government and became the cornerstone of British refugee 
policy.    
 
There were also numerous non-Jewish organisations interested in the refugee issue in 
Britain. The Society of Friends (Quakers) set up the German Emergency Committee 
(GEC) to include refugees who did not come within the scope of the Jewish 
organisations. Members of the Society of Friends worked in numerous cities and were 
regarded by the German government as the main bodies for assisting in the emigration of 
non-Jewish refugees.147 There were other Christian groups involved in work for refugees 
including the International Hebrew Christian Alliance, the Church of England Committee 
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for “non-Aryan” Christians and the Catholic Committee for Refugees. François Lafitte 
noted that overlapping in the case-work of these organisations “was overcome by 
increasing co-operation between the various case-working committees and the German 
Emergency Committee, until the later body came to be recognised as the Christian 
counterpart of the Jewish Refugee Committee.”148   
 
Some groups tried to help refugees or lobby in their favour. The Society for the 
Protection for Science and Learning (SPSL) was established in April 1933 under its 
former name, the Academic Assistance Council. It was made up of prominent academics, 
scientists and politicians. The SPSL devoted its efforts to finding placements for 
academic exiles in universities, industry and research institutions.149 The final destination 
of most refugee academics, however, was the United States, and Britain was no more that 
a country of temporary refuge.150  
 
The Left, the Labour Party and trades unions were particularly concerned with political 
refugees. These groups responded sympathetically to the plight of left-wing opposition in 
Austria and Germany, and social democratic opposition in Sudetenland.151 François 
Lafitte notes that the International Solidarity Fund which was controlled by the Labour 
Movement was devoted to helping Socialists and trade union officials who had to flee 
from Germany.152 
 
Not all the pressure groups and organisations which had an interest in the refugee issue 
were primarily concerned with the welfare of refugees. Some organisations tried to 
persuade the government to adopt an even more restrictive policy to refugees. Two 
prominent examples of specific groups that successfully lobbied against the admission of 
refugees were doctors and dentists. Both groups effectively lobbied the government to 
prevent large numbers of their foreign colleagues being allowed to enter Britain.153 For 
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instance, the Home Secretary wished to admit 500 Austrian doctors but felt unable to 
override the doctors’ opposition. A Medical Advisory Committee, composed of doctors 
and representatives of the refugee organisations, asserted that the numbers should not 
exceed fifty, to be selected from about 1000 applicants, who would be allowed to re-
qualify in Britain.154  
 
Far Right groups, like the British Union of Fascists and the Imperial Fascist League, were 
also against a more liberal refugee policy. Tony Kushner believes the most blatant 
opposition to refugees was from the BUF.155 The British Union of Fascists was vocal and 
consistent in its harassment of refugees throughout the 1930s until it was banned by the 
government in May 1940. The BUF viciously campaigned against refugees labelling 
them “refujews”.156 There was also a great deal hostility from the right-wing press, 
particularly the Beaverbrook, Rothermere, and Kemsley empires. Most of this opposition 
was on economic grounds.157   
 
Overall, voluntary organisations, especially Jewish ones, had major influence on policy 
on the formation and implementation of the refugee policy during the period March to 
September 1938. They worked alongside government officials and were even given 
“quasi-official status”. The major influence of the voluntary organisations had on refugee 
policy also led the government, in some instances, to place the responsibility for refugee 
policy on these organisations. On 1 November 1938, in a statement to the Inter-
governmental Committee on Refugees, Lord Winterton announced that “the only limit in 
fact to the number of refugees who can be admitted is constituted by the ability of the 
voluntary organisations to provide means for their maintenance and opportunities for 
their employment.”158 Some groups campaigned on behalf of refugees and others against 
them. This was another example of government policy being pulled in two directions by 
contradictory forces. Jewish organisations had an impact on government policy, but so 
did the doctors and dentists.  
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Domestic factors: Humanitarian Considerations 
 
Britain had an established tradition of granting asylum to political and religious refugees 
that had achieved an almost semi-constitutional status. At the Evian Conference, the 
British delegate, Lord Winterton, invoked this tradition: 
 It has been the traditional policy of successive British Governments to   
 offer asylum to persons who, for political, racial or religious reasons, have  
 had to leave their own countries. The United Kingdom has never had   
 cause to regret this policy, and refugees have often enriched the life and   
 contributed to the prosperity of the British people.159    
 
However, this tradition coexisted with the belief that refugees should be able to support 
themselves and their dependents. The British government classed Jewish refugees 
principally as immigrants and only secondarily as refugees. It believed the plight of 
Jewish refugees to be a problem of immigration rather than a duty of rescue.160 Louise 
London argues that:  
 refugees stood low on the national agenda, regarded as a mere humanitarian 
 problem. Home Office officials frequently reminded enquirers that there was no 
 such thing as a legal claim to asylum for refugees…. What qualified people for 
 entry was not the persecution they were leaving behind, but what they could bring 
 with them. The principles of selection emphasised the needs of Britain, the 
 country of refuge, rather than the plight of the refugee.161  
 
The position of the government in 1938 was, from the point of view of ministers, not a 
result of their indifference to human suffering. They just did not see it as being the role of 
the government to get involved in purely humanitarian issues.   
 
Humanitarian considerations were rarely mentioned in either parliament or the press in 
this period. In the House of Commons debates regarding refugees, Members of 
Parliament seldom referred to humanitarian aspects of the refugee problem. It was the 
same in the press. Instead, there was a great emphasis on economic considerations like 
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concern that refugees would become a drain on public finances or compete with Britons 
for jobs, and on fear of increasing anti-Semitism amongst the general population. 
 
Humanitarian rhetoric was occasionally used by government officials when discussing 
Britain’s contribution to the refugee problem. For example: at the Evian Conference, the 
British delegate, Lord Winterton, claimed that humanitarian considerations had led the 
British government to approve an even more liberal policy, but despite this no additions 
to the existing categories for admission were presented.162 It seems that the main purpose 
of humanitarian rhetoric, during this period, was to deflect criticism from existing policy.  
 
Humanitarian considerations did not have an important impact on refugee policy during 
this period. The government had a policy of not admitting refugees to Britain on 
humanitarian grounds alone and it seems that, during this period, this was respected by 
Members of parliament and the press because humanitarian issues were very seldom 
referred between March and September 1938. The only time humanitarianism was 
mentioned by the government was when it was discussing how “liberal” the 
government’s policy to refugees was. In contrast, pro-refugee activists frequently evoked 
humanitarian principles when trying to gain sympathy for refugees and when 
campaigning for a more liberal policy. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The refugee crisis being created by the Nazis was without precedent and the British 
government was unsure how to respond. British refugee policy was still in a formative 
stage and was therefore susceptible to outside influences of which there were many 
during the period March to September 1938. Some factors were pulling policy in a more 
lenient and interventionist direction. For instance, the American government wanted the 
British government to do more to help find a solution to the refugee problem. As a result 
of American pressure, the British reluctantly participated in international initiatives to 
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resolve the refugee crisis. Jewish organisations, on which the government was 
increasingly reliant, also wanted the British authorities to do more to help refugees from 
Central Europe. However, the majority of factors influencing refugee policy pushed the 
government to adopt harsher policies on the refugee issue. The economic situation in the 
late 1930s was bad and Britain was only just beginning to emerge from mass 
unemployment and recession. In this atmosphere the government was loath to allow 
thousands of destitute refugees into Britain to become a burden on public funds and, as 
the government and the Jewish organisations believed, stimulate anti-Semitism. The 
situation in East-Central Europe with these countries becoming increasingly anti-Semitic 
and openly voicing their desire to reduce their Jewish populations led the British 
government to believe that if refugee policy was liberalised these countries would 
escalate persecution and this would create even more refugees. The desire not to 
antagonise either the Nazis or the Arabs in Palestine and the Middle East was another 
factor driving refugee policy to be more restrictive.     
 
During this period, March to September 1938, the factors that commanded a hard line 
policy on refugees were dominant. This can be seen in the fact that the number of 
refugees permitted asylum in Britain was relatively small, especially when compared 
with the second period of this study. The single most important factor that influenced 
government refugee policy was concern over the relationship with Germany, partly 
because Germany was creating the problem in the first place, but mainly because 
improving relations with Germany and avoiding war was the over-riding goal of British 
foreign policy. Having said that, the relationship between Anglo-German diplomacy and 
the refugee issue was not straightforward. No matter how badly the British wanted good 
relations with Germany, there were limits to what the British government could be seen 
to condone. Government refugee policy, though greatly influenced by external forces, 
was also shaped by the assumptions and traditions that it had inherited from the past, and 
which are outlined in this chapter. In particular, it was not part of the British political 
tradition for government to play a proactive role in refugee policy, or to accept that it 
should be swayed by purely humanitarian considerations. These traditions came under 
pressure as a result of the unprecedented situation created by the Nazi persecution of the 
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Jews. As a result of all these factors, government refugee policy during the period March-
September 1938 was full of contradictions. The government claimed to be blind to race 
and religion, yet made Jewish organisations a cornerstone of the implementation of its 
policies. It claimed no refugee could be admitted for humanitarian reasons, yet under 
pressure it used the language of humanitarianism to justify its policies. It asserted the 
autonomy of British refugee policy, yet participated in international initiatives—however 
reluctantly—thereby conceding implicitly that the refugee crisis was not just a matter for 
national governments or bilateral diplomacy. The decisions made by the government help 
us to make inferences about the relative importance of the factors that influenced refugee 
policy. For example, in Palestine the desire to please the Americans was trumped by the 
desire to avoid making enemies of the Arabs. The desire of the government to maintain 
good relations with Jewish organisations was nothing like as important as the desire to 
achieve good relations with the Nazi regime. 
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Chapter 3 
The primacy of international events 
 
This third chapter covers the period October 1938 to August 1939. Like the previous 
chapter, it will focus on three key questions: What factors influenced the evolution and 
implementation of British policy to refugees?; In what ways did these factors influence 
British policy?; What was the relative importance of these factors during the period in 
question?  
Whereas the pervious chapter was structured around the various factors that influenced 
refugee policy, this chapter will explore the impact of these factors by discussing in turn 
the international events that dominated the political agenda of the British government 
between the Sudetenland crisis and the outbreak of World War Two. The German 
annexation of the Sudetenland in October 1938, the "Kristallnacht" purge of Germany's 
Jews in November 1938, and the German invasion of Bohemia and Moravia in March 
1939, all had a huge impact on British refugee policy. British refugee policy during this 
period was thus driven by the need to respond to actions taken by the German 
government. Nevertheless, British responses were modulated by domestic factors and 
concerns, and by the traditions of British political culture.  
In particular, this chapter will discuss the changes that occurred between October 1938 
and August 1939 and the relative importance of the factors that influenced British refugee 
policy. Some factors, such as popular anti-Semitism, become rather less important during 
this period than they had been between March and September 1938. Other factors, which 
had hitherto been of peripheral importance, such as humanitarianism, became much more 
important in the aftermath of the Sudeten crisis. Some factors, in particular the focus of 
the British government on Anglo-German relations, remained just as important after the 
Munich Agreement as they had been before it. 
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The annexation of the Sudetenland and Czech refugees 
 
The Munich Agreement had a significant impact on British refugee policy. In September 
1938, Germany's demand that the Sudetenland be incorporated in the Reich brought 
Europe to the brink of war. The British and French governments pressured the Czechs to 
concede the Sudetenland to Hitler; all the Czech government could do was to comply. A 
relieved Neville Chamberlain returned from his trip to Munich to declare that he had 
secured "peace for our time". 
 
Though the concessions made by the British government at Munich had resolved the 
international crisis and postponed the outbreak of war, it immediately worsened the 
refugee situation in Czechoslovakia.163 During September, thousands of people had fled 
from the Sudeten areas. After the agreement, the Sudeten areas were surrendered to 
Germany and occupied from 1 October 1938. But the refugee exodus continued; refugees 
continued to flee from the Sudetenland into what remained of Czechoslovakia. This crisis 
was exacerbated by provisions in the Munich Agreement in which exchanges and 
transfers of population were to occur between the Sudetenland and the rest of 
Czechoslovakia.164 The refugees fell into three distinct groups, the first of which 
comprised anti-Nazi Sudeten Germans, most of whom were members of the German 
Social Democratic Party. They had lived in the Sudetenland and were of German origin. 
The second group consisted of refugees from Germany and Austria, the majority of 
whom were Jews who had come to Czechoslovakia in the wake of Anschluss. Jews from 
the Sudetenland itself constituted the third group. Taken together, these three groups 
comprised the bulk of refugees who needed to be resettled outside Czechoslovakia. But 
there were also concerns about the position of some 300,000 Jews who lived in Bohemia, 
Moravia, Slovakia and Czech Ruthenia. Although they were not refugees their position 
looked more and more uncertain.165 
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Although the degree of the financial and strategic loss caused by the dismemberment of 
Czechoslovakia was vaguely perceived at Munich the impact on the refugee problem was 
not considered.166 However, because the refugee crisis that was unfolding was clearly a 
result of the Munich Agreement, the British government recognised that it needed to 
respond. As Louise London notes, the British Foreign Office “tried to stave off further 
Czech expulsions and emphasised the need to respect the refugees’ rights under the 
Munich Agreement to a guaranteed future” in the rump of Czechoslovakia. But it became 
obvious that rights to Czech nationality were irrelevant compared to the immediate plight 
and difficulties faced by thousands of refugees, many of whom were seeking urgent 
assistance from foreign governments.167  
 
There were a number of reasons why the British felt they could not wash their hands of 
the refugee crisis that was developing in Czechoslovakia. To begin with, there was cross-
party agreement that it was in Britain’s national interests to try to help stabilise the 
situation in Czechoslovakia in order to prevent it falling further under German influence. 
Clement Attlee, for example, argued at the time that:  
 if we can have an independent Czechoslovakia, I think we should support it in 
 every possible way. We owe so much to Czechoslovakia. If, on the other hand, 
 Czechoslovakia is to become a mere vassal State of Germany, very different 
 conditions will apply.168  
 
Many British politicians also felt a degree of moral responsibility towards these refugees 
and a certain amount of guilt for the plight they now faced. One Member of Parliament 
stated: “We owe these people a great debt, and I hope that the Government will feel that 
they have the public opinion of the country behind them in every effort that they may 
make on their behalf”.169 According to A. J. Sherman, “as the dimensions of the problem 
began to be grasped the Government was to find it increasingly difficult to reject this 
notion”.170 The view that the British (and French) governments had a moral responsibility 
to help these refugees was also asserted by virtually every group and association that had 
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an interest in refugee affairs. Refugee advocate, Eleanor Rathbone, declared in the 
Manchester Guardian “his [Chamberlain’s] action may depend on how far public opinion 
at home is aroused on behalf of these victims—these scapegoats by whose sacrifice some 
hope to obtain immunity from the tragedy of war. May that public opinion manifest itself 
in sufficient volume and quickly”.171 Her hope was that, by provoking public sympathy 
for the Czech refugees, the government could be pressed into liberalising its refugee 
policy. 
 
Much of the general population also believed the Munich Agreement had spared them the 
horrors of war but at the expense of the Czechs. Thousands contributed to funds set up 
for these refugees. Two important such funds were “The Lord Mayor’s Fund for 
Refugees from Czecho-slovakia”, which raised proceeds amounting to ₤360,000, and the 
“News Chronicle Fund for Czech refugees”, which raised ₤44,420.172 Atlee stated that he 
believed there to be:  
 enormous sympathy in this country for the plight of the refugees from  
 Sudetenland. Many thousands of people have been placed in a terrible position. 
 The people of this country have subscribed a great sum of money, and I think we  
 ought to pay tribute here to the Lord Mayor of London for his courage and 
 activity in this matter.173  
 
Members of the public wrote “many letters expressing their deepest concern at the 
immediate fate and future of the dispossessed people from the occupied regions of 
Czechoslovakia.”174 
 
The British government offered the Czech government ₤10 million in early October; this 
was a counter-offer to the Czech request for ₤30 million immediately after the Munich 
settlement. Officials at Whitehall believed that they would be able to insist the money be 
used for purposes they regarded as “permanent and constructive”.175 Of the total sum, ₤4 
million was “designated as a gift for the relief and resettlement of refugees within 
                                                 
171 The Manchester Guardian, 3 October 1938, p. 16.  
172 J. Simpson, Refugees: A Review of the Situation since September 1938, p. 77. 
173 Hansard, 1 November 1938, p. 66.  
174 The Manchester Guardian, 5 October 1938, p. 9. 
175 Sherman, p. 145. 
  53  
Czechoslovakia and overseas”.176 The government also established the British 
Committee for Refugees from Czechoslovakia (BCRC) in October 1938 to administe
the ₤4 million fund. The money was to help resettle refugees who had fled from the 
portions of Czech territory ceded to Germany at Munich. Although the British 
government stressed the point that the money was to be available on a non-discrimi
basis, not all refugees were eligible for financial assistance from this fund. Political 
refugees, like the Sudeten Social Democrats, were favoured over non-political Jews. Th
was due to the belief shared by the Home Office and the BCRC, that if the mass 
emigration of non-political Jews was assisted it would be playing into the hands of the 
Gestapo and would be likely to encourage further persecution. Louise London, believes 
this demonstrates the importance which British officials assigned to resisting pressure for 
the forced expulsion of Jews throughout Europe.
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177 The British government reluctantly
allocated a limited number of visas to BCRC cases, but it was intended that the greater
part of the Czech refugee problem should be controlled in the remains of Czechoslovakia,
or dealt with by direct re-emigration overseas.178 The BCRC brought the relief work for
these refugees directly under Home Office and Treasury control. This was at a time w
all other refugees were still supported by voluntary contributions and cared for by 
voluntary organisations.179 British officials repeatedly stated the uniqueness of the 
situation in regards to Czech refugees but it became increasingly difficult to maintain the 
distinction between refugees from Germany and Austria and those from 
Given the government’s refusal to finance other refugees,181 the establishment of the 
Czech Fund was a remarkable breakthrough and can be seen as the first liberalisation of 
Britain’s refugee policy. This liberalisation was instigated by public pressure. Individual 
members of parliament seem to have felt a degree of guilt and a responsibility for Cze
refugees but it was public opinion, or the potential of public opinion, that pressed the 
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government into action on behalf of these refugees. There is a clear causal relationsh
between Munich and the liberalisation. It demonstrates how potent the international 
situation could be in affecting refugee policy, especially when it interacted with the pang
of conscience. The contrast with the toughening of restrictions on German and Austrian 
refugees is apparent, but that can be explained by the fact that Britain felt no equivalent 
guilt about the Anschluss. It is important to note that refugee policy took a decisive step 
in a new direction before foreign policy. This means that refugee policy had a degree of
autonomy and was not completely subordinate to international relations and that it was 
not just the slave of appeasement. Rather, it was a
ip 
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 response to guilt—or at least a sense of 
responsibility—brought about by appeasement.  
Kristallnacht” and German and Austrian refugees
 
“  
 a fresh 
 
 
 
orth of damage was done. This was followed by increased anti-
wish legislation.182  
ews 
 that 
of 
                    
 
Within weeks of the annexation of the Sudetenland, the Nazi government created
challenge for British refugee policy with a sudden and dramatic escalation in its 
persecution of the Jewish population in Germany. On the night of 9-10 November 1938,
organised bands of SA thugs attacked and plundered Jewish shops, schools, homes and 
synagogues. Ninety-one people were killed on “Kristallnacht”, thousands were assaulted
and 20,000 individuals were arrested and sent to concentration camps. Several hundred
million Reichsmarks w
Je
 
These ghastly events provoked a wave of public sympathy for German and Austrian J
among the British public. Much was written in the press describing the violence and 
destruction that occurred on “Kristallnacht” and numerous letters were published
testified to the outrage felt by ordinary British people. For example, a letter was 
published in The Times on 22 November with the blunt message: “Sir,—We wish to 
record our solemn protest, before the conscience of civilization, against the persecution 
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the Jews in Germany.”183 This letter was signed by some hundred individuals, many
whom, like Violet Bonham Carter, J. B. Priestley, and R. Stafford Cripps were promine
public figures. Neville Chamberlain, aware of the British public’s outrage over the 
“Kristallnacht” pogrom, announced in the House of Commons that “there will be deep 
and widespread sympathy here for those who are being made to suffer so severely.”
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The more sympathetic public attitude to Jewish refugees created by the events of 9-10 
November prevailed in Britain until late spring 1940. However, the fact that many peopl
were sympathetic to Jews did not mean that anti-Semitism completely disappeared. It i
significant, however, that anti-Semitism is much less prominent in the primary source
after “Kristallnacht”. While anti-Semitism cannot explain the liberalisation of refugee 
policy that occurred in this period, anti-Semitism was one factor that can potentially 
explain why the liberalisation did not go further. It can account for why the government 
still wanted refugees’ stay in Britain to be temporary and wanted them to settle ov
So, while anti-Semitism does not explain why policies changed, it explains why in som
instances they changed very little or even remained the same. The importance of 
international events in moulding public opinion in regards to “Kristallnacht” is clear. 
Nevertheless, the reason that “Kristallnacht” had this effect on opinion was because of 
the moral values held by the majority of the British populatio
v
have felt little sympathy for the victims of the Nazi regime.  
 
“Kristallnacht” also aroused great sympathy for German and Austrian refugees in 
government circles. Numerous Members of Parliament were concerned that the British
government made it “known to the German Government the deep feeling of horror 
aroused in this country among all sections of the people by the action which has been 
taken against the Jews.”185 As well as acknowledging British outrage, MPs wanted some 
concrete action to be taken to help persecuted Jews. Colonel Wedgwood, Labour m
for Newcastle under Lyme, asked: “Cannot His Majesty’s Government show the feeling
of this country by attempting to do something for the victims of this oppression in 
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Germany?”186 Mr Lipson wanted “an urgent and immediate meeting of the committee, 
which was appointed after the Evian Conference in order to see whether more rigorous 
and prompt measures can be taken to find a home for these persecuted Jews”.187 Anot
MP, Mr Alexander, wanted “the possibility of consultation with the President, or other 
her 
presentatives of the United States of America, with a view to a joint representation 
the 
le as a 
educe 
 
wing 
es and 
 children 
ng 
                                                
re
being made” to the German government to show unified outrage at “Kristallnacht”.188  
 
The liberalisation of Britain’s refugee policy, which had begun in the aftermath of 
Munich Agreement, was given significant new impetus by public and government 
sympathy for the plight of Germany’s Jews. As Louise London notes, the Cabinet 
decided to speed up and simplify immigration procedures for refugees; Britain’s ro
temporary refuge was also expanded. 189 Procedural changes were introduced to r
some of the delay that was caused by the investigation of visa cases overseas. The 
process of approval was simplified and the mechanics of entry were speeded up. 
Voluntary organisations were allowed to select refugees for admission to Britain. 190  
These nominal roles largely replaced the process of individual visas and made possible 
the use of block visas. Other new developments included the admission of large numbers
of male refugees as trans-migrants and transports of unaccompanied children. Follo
the government decision to facilitate the entry of child refugees, The Movement for the 
Care of Children from Germany (which became known as the Refugee Children’s 
Movement) was established under the joint chairmanship of Sir Wyndham Deed
Viscount Samuel. This organisation supervised the “emigration and allocation of
in cooperation with over 100 local committees throughout Britain which made 
themselves responsible for maintenance of the children in hostels pending their 
placement with families.”191 The Refugee Children’s Movement is credited with bringi
9,354 children to Britain before the outbreak of war.192 However, the principle of 
restriction through pre-selection remained unchanged. What qualified people for entry 
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into Britain was not the degree of persecution they faced but what they could bring t
Britain. For some refugees their wealth was the key to their admission, while 
was their youth.
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rganisations and refugee bodies were unable to finance settlement schemes. The final 
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situation. In July 1939, the government agreed to commit public funds but solely to 
                                                
193 In other words, whilst humanitarian concerns were important in 
shaping the response of British public opinion to events in Germany, neither 
humanitarianism nor public opinion were paramount in the formulation of British refugee
policy. The gap between the pub
d
response, which did, is telling.  
 
“Kristallnacht” and the consequent liberalisation of refugee policy led to such a dra
increase of refugees that the voluntary organisations were no longer able to cope. 
Historians have found it difficult to determine the exact numbers of refugees who 
received asylum in Britain. However, they do agree that the time after “Kristallna
before the outbreak of World War Two was the period of major immigration. By the ti
of the Evian Conference the German refugee population in Britain was 8,000.194 
However, by September 1939 the number of refugees in Germany had reached ab
80,000.195 The Jewish organisations had been under increasing financial strains since 
1938. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Jewish organisations told the 
government in the wake of Anschluss that they could no longer automatically guarantee 
cover for all new refugees. Instead, refugees needed to be approved by the Jewish 
organisations before they arrived in Britain. The Jewish organisations stated they
only guarantee newly admitted refugees if they were cleared by the organisation in 
advance. Then, by July 1939, it became clear to the government that the Jewish 
o
collapse of the Jewish bodies’ efforts to honour the guarantee came in September 193
 
The government began to realise the dire situation the voluntary organisations were 
facing, and reluctantly and gradually softened the official line on financing the refugee
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finance the costs of re-emigration of refugees from Britain to countries of permanent 
settlement.196 Britain had a stagnant pool of refugees, many of whom had been allowed 
into the country as trans-migrants and had yet to leave. The government agreed to financ
re-emigration of these refugees as it would decrease the numbers of refugees in Brit
and lower the costs faced by the voluntary organisations as they would have fewer 
refugees to maintain. In August 1939, the government was “contemplating depart
from their original attitude that there could be no Government money devoted to 
refugees.”
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197 But the government only agreed to fund the refugee policy when it b
evident that there was no other body that could finance it. Up until this point the 
government had refused to finance the maintenance of refugees, re-emigration and eve
the administrative costs of refugee policy because there were voluntary organisations 
(particularly Jewish ones) with money that were prepared to take up this responsibility.19
With the funds of these organisations exhausted and no other financial alternative apa
from government finance, Whitehall realised the time had come when it had to take 
responsibility for the refugee situation. In December 1939, ministers accepted a proposa
from the Home Office that governmental funding was necessary since the funds of the
Jewish organisations were exhausted. From December on, Whitehall subsidised the:  
 costs of refugee maintenance and re-emigration and the Jewish organisation’s 
 administrative expenses. A monthly grant was paid by the Central Committee for 
Refugees (CCR), a new non-sectarian body approved by the Hom 
 
 
The government’s financing of refugee policy was a result of the flood of refugees caused
by developments in Europe. However, that the international situation led to change o
because the voluntary organisations could not cope and because letting the situation 
deteriorate would create a scandal and offend the British (and American) conscience. 
Clearly, then, whatever the government said in public about its humanitarian concern for 
the victims of Nazism, its refugee policy was still under the influence of more pragmatic
concerns. Though the liberalisation of refugee policy which had begun in October 1
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was greatly accelerated by public and governmental sympathy for the plight of the 
ersecuted, it was still being constrained by economic considerations.    p
Negotiating with Germany: the Schacht Plan and the Rublee Plan 
 
The disgust aroused by “Kristallnacht” was not allowed to interfere with appeasement. 
According to Louise London, Chamberlain “believed that decent relations with Nazi 
Germany would be possible if extremes of persecution could be avoided. His horror at 
Nazi atrocities was therefore combined with frustration at the damage they caus
Anglo-German relations.” Chamberlain’s hope that the Nazi regime would moderate its 
anti-Jewish actions was linked to his desire to strive for friendly relations with 
Germany.
ed to 
 
fugees 
sure 
wish 
oth the 
ritish and the Germans to find solutions to this problem, though the British entered into 
o 
refugee loan which was to be raised by Jewish contributors, but it also stipulated that 
200 Accordingly, the British government during the period in question 
continued efforts to find negotiated solutions to the refugee problem, above all in the so-
called Schacht and Rublee Plans. German emigration policy, in which Jews and non-
Aryans were stripped of up to 90 percent of their wealth on departure from Germany, was
one of the main obstacles to improved Anglo-German relations. Britain, along with other 
nations of asylum, believed the Nazi Regime should be held accountable for the re
fleeing Germany as she was the refugee producing state. The British hoped to pres
Germany into cooperating over letting Jews depart with sufficient means to fund their 
own emigration and maintenance in the host country if they wished to achieve Je
emigration.201 The Foreign Office believed that since the Nationalist Socialist Regime 
was so determined to get rid of the Jews they would be prepared to make some 
concessions to expedite their departure.202 There were attempts on the part of b
B
these negotiations with more good faith than their Nazi negotiating partners.   
 
The Schacht Plan was initiated by the president of the Reichsbank, Hjalmer Schacht, wh
travelled to London in December 1938 to present a plan to facilitate Jewish emigration. 
His plan envisaged the financing of Jewish emigration by the means of an international 
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there had to be an increase in the export of German goods.203 From the German point of 
view, the Schacht Plan, which had been approved by Hitler, had the advantage that it
allowed the German government to confiscate Jewish wealth without compensation 
whilst at the same time boosting German exports. The detained Jewish assets would b
kept by German authorities as a trust fund; a quarter of these funds could be used by 
emigrants to purchase supplies and facilities from German companies. However, the 
majority of the resettlements costs would have to be financed by outside Jewish sources
through a bond which the trust fund would be the collateral.
 still 
e 
 
” 
sal and 
 
n as the Rublee Plan, which he presented at the IGCR meeting in 
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204 Reaction to the Schacht 
Plan was hostile. Jewish leaders in Britain and other countries refused to meet to consider 
the plan because they did not want to lend weight to the idea that an “international Jewry
existed. Nonetheless, George Rublee and the IGCR saw some merit in the propo
wanted to continue negotiations. By this time, Schacht had resigned because of 
disagreements with Hitler over management of the German economy and Hermann 
Goering had replaced him as chief negotiator. Goering made it clear he considered the
Jews to be exports with which to raise foreign exchange. Rublee’s efforts produced a 
revised agreement, know
F
 
The Rublee Plan involved the ordered emigration of those who fell into the category of 
wage earners (Jewish men and single women between the ages of fifteen and forty-five 
who were individually capable of earning a living and fit for emigration) over a peri
five years. Those who were classed in the dependent category would be allowed to 
emigrate once the wage earners were established and able to receive them. Under th
Rublee Plan, Germany agreed to allow dependents to “live tranquilly, unless some 
extraordinary circumstances should occur”.206 Emigration would be partly financed by a 
trust fund which was to be set up in Germany; it was to be equal to about one quarter of 
all Jewish property in Germany. The fund could then be used for travel and to pu
German-made equipment. The German-made equipment could only be used for 
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colonisation and not for sale overseas. Emigrants would not be subject to special flight 
taxes and would be allowed to take all their personal belongings, except jewellery, w
them. The 200,000 elderly Jews not covered by this agreement would be allowed to liv
out their old age in Germany without persecution. This was an improvement on the 
Schacht Plan as it allowed refugees to leave Germany with significantly more of thei
capital.
ith 
e 
r 
h 
CR 
ntal 
Less than two months 
fter the formulation of the Coordinating Foundation, World War Two broke out and the 
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207 The German authorities refused to allow the plan to be extended to non-Jewis
refugees. The United States government strongly supported this plan and the IG
quickly approved it. In Britain, Jewish leaders supported it but other non-governme
organisations were divided about the merits of this plan. The American Jewish 
community, in particular the Jewish Labour Committee and the American Jewish 
Congress, was opposed to the plan because it disturbed their boycott of German-made 
goods. Negotiations progressed very slowly and an independent settlement corporation 
was established (the Coordinating Foundation) on 20 July 1939. 
a
Rublee Plan became null and void, having achieved nothing.208 
 
These plans can be seen as part of the policy of appeasement, but they also met some of 
Britain’s objectives to existing arrangements. The Rublee Plan would at least have mean
that Jewish refugees were better off than before, which is why it gained the support of t
Jewish organisations and the Americans. Nevertheless, both plans demonstrate that the 
international situation was crucial in the determination of refugee policy. They were a
response to the crisis caused by the ever-increasing numbers of refugees from Germ
and Austria and they conceded numerous German demands. However, the plans also 
reflected the values and concerns of the British: their conviction that international 
problems were best resolved by negotiation and compromise and their desire to reduce 
the costs of receiving large numbers of penniless refugees. If the British had not placed
such importance on negotiation and had not been so determined to reduce the costs of 
dealing with these destitute refugees, these plans would never have been considered.  
That these plans were never put into effect was primarily a result of the outbreak of war, 
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but fundamental differences between Britain and Germany were also a factor. The T
Reich’s Nazi ideology was more important to Germany than its desire to placate Britain. 
Britain, for her part, was growing more concerned about aspects of German policy 
(especially the persecution of Jews and non-Aryans) that she could neither condone nor 
ignore. On the other hand, that the British government was prepared to accept refugees 
lacking independent means of support, and who would be largely dependent on charity, 
reduced the pressure on Germany to cooperate over letting Jews depart with sufficien
means if it wished to achieve Jewish emigration. As h
hird 
t 
as been established before, it was 
ot just the international situation that was important, but the context that guides the 
terpretation of the situation and the response to it.  
n
in
 
 
The impact of the invasion of Bohemian and Moravia on refugee policy  
 
With the invasion of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939, appeasement suffered a 
decisive setback. Hitler had shown the world that Germany would not settle just to
her “reasonable” demands met but wanted to make territorial gains as well. For the firs
time, German troops had seized territory the population of which was largely non-
German. Those in favour of appeasement still hoped for peace, but they realised the
hopes were slim. They started to prepare with
 have 
t 
ir 
 greater urgency for a war against Germany. 
his view, that war was now likely, perhaps inevitable, had a significant impact on 
rch 1939, 
government’s decision to give Poland “a unilateral and unconditional guarantee” against 
any German threat or aggression.210 This guarantee of Poland was only of Polish 
                                                
T
refugee policy.  
 
Poland, which would be the obvious target of any further German aggression, was now 
courted as an ally. After Germany’s occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in Ma
Britain and France became more active in trying to block any further German expansion 
in this area.209 On 30 March 1939, Neville Chamberlain announced the British 
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independence, and explicitly excluded Polish territorial integrity. This was transformed 
by the agreement of 6 April into a virtual alliance.211 
 
All these developments had major implications for British refugee policy, for roughly 10 
percent of Poland’s thirty-five million inhabitants were Jewish. The position of Jews in 
Poland was deteriorating, partly as a result of increasing German influence, but also on 
account of a sharpening of the anti-Semitic mood in Poland itself. Estimates were made 
by the Polish government according to which one third of the Polish population was 
surplus. Experts believed there were three possible solutions to the situation: one, mass 
industrialisation; two, mass starvation; three, mass migration.212 Since mass 
industrialisation in a short period of time was not feasible, whilst starvation was 
undesirable, mass migration was the preferred choice and Poland’s Jews were placed 
under increasing pressure in the hope that they would leave. Accordingly to Dorothy 
Thompson, a contemporary expert on the refugee situation: 
  Many Jews have suffered violence – and many more live in constant fear of 
 physical danger. While the Polish government officially maintains the equality of 
 the Jews with all other Polish citizens, it sets about – in its quiet way – to squeeze 
 the Jews out of economic life, mainly by means of tax and credit policies directed 
 against commerce and trade, which especially hit the Jews.213  
 
Added to the existing anti-Jewish feeling in Poland, Polish anti-Semites were 
emboldened by the German example. These factors caused an increase in the numbers of 
Polish refugees.  Hitherto, the British had been unsympathetic and uncooperative towards 
Poland’s attempts to get rid of her Jews. Britain had refused to acknowledge Poland as a 
“refugee producing state” and the United States prevented her from attending the Evian 
Conference as a “refugee producer”.214 Polish refugees, and refugees from East-Central 
Europe, were refused asylum in Britain and sent them back to their country of origin. 
This was because Britain did not consider that these refugees suffered the same 
persecution as Jews and non-Aryans in Germany and saw nothing wrong with returning 
them to East-Central Europe. After the invasion of Bohemia and Moravia, however, this 
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policy was reversed and the admission of refugees from Poland was prioritised, even over 
those from Czechoslovakia. Additionally, Herbert Emerson, Director of the 
Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, had assured Polish authorities that the BCRC 
would take responsibly for a large number of families in Poland.215 So eager was the 
British government to facilitate the migration of Jews from Poland that it continued to 
prioritise such refugees even after the outbreak of the war. A Foreign Office 
memorandum of 10 November 1939 mentions a government grant of ₤100,000 for the 
relief of Polish refugees and notes that: “All the departments concerned are now most 
willingly assisting in the co-ordinated handling of the Polish refugee problem”.216 Once 
more, the crucial role of the international situation in shaping refugee policy can be seen. 
However, as before, the situation produced its effect only through its interaction with the 
values that guided the way in which the situation was interpreted. These were values that 
placed a premium on national survival, with Poland being cultivated as an ally against 
Hitler.    
 
The invasion of Bohemia and Moravia also had an impact on the situation in Palestine 
specifically with regard to refugees. Britain was being pressed by Jewish organisations 
and the Americans to turn Palestine into a haven for Jewish refugees. At the same time, 
the Arab states and the Palestinian Arabs, who had been in revolt since 1936, were 
pressuring the British government to prevent any further Jewish immigration to Palestine. 
Up until this point, Britain’s response had tilted towards the Arabs, but satisfied neither 
side. It was only after the invasion of Bohemia and Moravia that British policy further 
tilted towards the Arabs and ruled out both a Jewish Palestine and the partition of 
Palestine. The British government’s desire to find a negotiated solution to the worsening 
situation in Palestine led it to organise the London Conferences. This series of formal 
meetings between Palestinian Arabs, Jews, Whitehall, and neighbouring Arab States was 
intended to solve the problems in Palestine and bring an end to the Arab Revolt; the May 
1939 White Paper was the result of these meetings.217 The 1939 White Paper consisted of 
three sections which dealt with the constitution of the projected Palestinian State, 
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immigration and land. In the first section the British government declared that it was not 
part of its policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State and Partition was 
dismissed. The new objective of the government was to establish “a State in which the 
two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in government in such a way 
that the essential interests of each is secured”.218 In regards to Jewish immigration, a 
ceiling was set of 75,000 admissions over the next five years, after which Jewish 
immigration would be permitted only with Arab consent. Additional preventative 
measures to check illegal immigration would be taken.219 The High Commissioner was 
given powers “to prohibit and regulate the transfers of land” between Arabs and Jews in 
Palestine.220  
 
The White Paper was very controversial and satisfied neither the Arabs nor the Jews. It 
was of little concern to the general British population, who were far more interested in 
international affairs in Europe. Some Arab spokesmen acknowledged that it went a 
substantial way towards recognising the basic claims of the Arab nationalists. Otherwise, 
Arab reactions to the paper varied but the majority of neighbouring Arab states did not 
support it.221 The Jewish quasi-government did not hesitate to proclaim that it would 
resist the implementation of the White Paper.222 The Zionists were strongly against it and 
used numerous means to encourage opposition to the government’s policy.223 The 
Zionists undermined the White Paper by illegal action in the form of encouraging and 
even organising illegal immigration. From late 1938 onwards, illegal immigration was 
organised on an increasing scale. In 1939, 11,156 out of 27,561 were illegal 
immigrants.224 Approximately 1,300 illegal immigrants entered Palestine between 1 April 
1939 and 24 May 1939.225 At one point legal migration was stopped completely because 
of the numbers of illegal immigrants. In July 1939, the Colonial Secretary announced to 
the House that due to large numbers of illegal immigrants landing in Palestine in the 
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previous months that no immigration quota would be issued for the following quota 
period, which was from 1 October 1939 to 31 March 1940.226  
 
The main reason why the British made more concessions to the Arabs than to the Zionists 
was that the invasion of Bohemia and Moravia forced the British to prioritise their 
preparations for war. If war should break out in Europe, which now seemed much more 
likely, the British knew that they could not afford to keep large numbers of troops in 
Palestine for internal security purposes.227 In the view of J. C. Hurewitz, Britain was 
compelled by the pressure of European events to seek swift and decisive results. The 
underlying purpose of the London Conferences was the strengthening of Britain’s 
imperial defences.228 Hurewitz asserts that the drawn out Arab Revolt had undermined 
Britain’s “prestige throughout a pivotal region of the Empire’s defence system”.229 
Britain could also not afford to alienate the oil-producing Arab states whose oil she 
would need for the war effort and would surely be courted by Germany. Indeed, Germany 
(and Italy) had begun actively to intervene in the internal affairs of the Middle East and 
especially in Palestine where they had provided Palestinian rebels with material and 
moral aid.230 The British were acutely aware that they could not compete with Germany 
when making promises to the Arabs because Germany could always offer more.231 So the 
May 1939 White Paper, coming two months after the invasion of Bohemia and Moravia, 
put at least one leg off the fence and on the Arab side. It rejected outright the sort of 
“Palestinian solution” to the refugee problem supported by both the Americans and 
Jewish organisations. Although it is difficult to show definitively that this change of 
policy was directly linked with security considerations prompted by the destruction of 
Czechoslovakia and the looming threat of war, the circumstantial evidence is very strong. 
The changed international situation brought about by Hitler’s dismemberment of 
Czechoslovakia is the crucial variable that explains why Britain’s policy changed when it 
did. However, the international situation produced this outcome only because it was 
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interpreted through a set of assumptions and values that placed an overwhelming 
importance on Britain’s survival in any upcoming war. 
 
The invasion of Bohemia and Moravia also had an impact on British relations with the 
United States, particularly in regards to refugee issues. The British were aware that, if 
war broke out, they would be reliant on the financial and economic support of the 
Americans, so had to be careful not to alienate them. There was therefore an element of 
risk in rejecting the type of “Palestinian solution” that the Americans favoured. The 
Zionists tried to gain the support of the Americans in their opposition to the White Paper. 
As Bernard Wasserstein points out, the British were extremely conscious of the capacity 
of American Jews to influence the United Sates government and American public 
opinion. President Roosevelt informed the British of his interests in the matter and, on the 
publication of the White Paper, he expressed “a good deal of dismay”.  But, fortunately 
for His Majesty’s Government, British officials had judged the situation correctly.  The 
Americans understood why the British had made the decision to incline towards the 
Arabs and limit Jewish immigration. While publicly criticising the British policy to 
satisfy American Jewish opinion they reassured them in private that they would not allow 
the matter to affect the British-American relationship. Joseph Kennedy, the American 
Ambassador in London, was instructed to advise the Foreign Office “that there was 
widespread disappointment in the U.S.A. with the White Paper, and in particular with its 
immigration provisions.”232 But Ambassador Kennedy also privately assured Malcolm 
MacDonald, the Secretary for Colonies that, “while the American Jews might cause 
public commotion over the White Paper, the policy of the Administration would not be 
affected.”233 The very dangerous situation introduced by the destruction of 
Czechoslovakia was appreciated by the Roosevelt administration. Though the Americans 
disliked the way the British were handling the Palestinian situation, they had no desire to 
see the British defeated by a German regime that it detested.   
The invasion of Bohemia and Moravia was hugely significant in overall diplomatic 
history because appeasement was seen to have failed. The Polish guarantee signified a 
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change of government policy to Germany. War became a real possibility and the British 
began to focus on the security of the empire. This had a significant impact on refugee 
policy. Poland was courted as an ally and as a result priority was given to Polish refugees. 
The Middle East was seen as pivotal region of the empire and the British needed calm in 
this area so Britain sided further with the Arabs in Palestine. The invasion of Bohemia 
and Moravia also had an impact on the Americans who became much more 
understanding of Britain’s position in terms of Palestine. 
 
Conclusion  
In the first period that we examined, March to September 1938, the formulation and 
implementation of British policy to refugees were shaped by a contradictory set of 
factors, some of which pushed Britain towards a harsher policy to refugees, and some of 
which pulled the British government towards more lenient policies. Overall, however, the 
combined influence of the former was greater than that of the latter. As a result, refugee 
policy was restrictive and the number of refugees permitted asylum in Britain was 
relatively small. One of the most important factors during this period was Britain’s desire 
to establish a positive relationship with Germany and to avoid antagonising the Nazi 
regime. In this first phase, Germany’s policies towards the Jews and towards her 
neighbours were a major influence on refugee policy, but other issues had their own 
independent importance as influences on the formation of policy 
Between October 1938 and August 1939, government policy to Germany was in a state 
of flux. Where the Munich Agreement of September 1938 had represented the high point 
of appeasement, the invasion of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939 forced the British 
government finally to take a stronger stance against German aggression. During the 
whole of this second phase of refugee policy, foreign policy, especially in terms of 
Germany, was clearly the driving force of refugee policy. Every major change in 
Britain’s refugee policy during this period was a response to changes in the international 
situation. But although the international situation was the variable that explained how 
policy changed over time, policy was not just affected by international developments; 
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each British response depended on either British assumptions or the circumstances in 
Britain during this period. The Munich settlement led to the first significant liberalisation 
of refugee policy because the public (and to a lesser degree the government) felt a sense 
of guilt over the treatment of the Czechs in the wake of the settlement. The liberalisation, 
which had begun in October with the Munich Agreement, was greatly accelerated by 
“Kristallnacht” as a result of the outrage and sympathy felt by the British public and the 
government to this persecution. Yet, for all its moral indignation at events in Germany, 
the British government did not allow “Kristallnacht” to interfere with appeasement and 
its efforts to find a negotiated settlement. Nor did the British government stop worrying 
about the economic impact of refugees. With the invasion of Bohemia and Moravia, the 
over-riding importance of national security was highlighted. For refugee policy it meant 
priority was given to Polish refugees because Britain wanted Poland as an ally. In 
Palestine, the British sided further with the Arabs to ensure calm in the Middle East and 
access to Arab oil for any upcoming war. The invasion of Bohemia and Moravia also had 
an impact on the Americans who became more understanding of British policy in regards 
to Palestine and respected that national security had become paramount.  
In chapter two, Germany’s policies towards the Jews and towards her neighbours were a 
major influence on refugee policy, but other issues had their own independent importance 
as influences on the formation of policy. From October 1938, and especially from March 
1939, they played a less independent role. Increasingly, they were inspired by revulsion 
at German outrages or by fear of German aggression. In particular, it was the concession 
to German demands over the Sudetenland that led the rather guilt-ridden British to decide 
to accept Czech refugees, it was outrage at “Kristallnacht” that led to greater sympathy 
for German and Austrian refugees; and it was the threat of German aggression that led 
Britain to accommodate the Polish demands that Britain help solve Poland’s self-created 
refugee problem. So policy with regard to Central Europe changed, but it did so because 
of what Germany did, not because of want Czechoslovakia or Poland did. So East-
Central Europe no longer had an independent influence on the formulation of policy. 
Similarly, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, it was fear of Germany that prompted 
changes in British policy towards the use of Palestine as a dumping ground for refugees, 
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and that led Britain to disregard American views on the issue. So again, it was the fear of 
German aggression, not what the Arabs or Jews or Americans did, that led to the change 
of policy. Although the attitude of the Arabs was important, it achieved this importance 
only because the threat of Germany meant that Britain had to keep the Arabs onside and 
edge away from the Zionists and the Americans.  
With regard to the economic concerns and anti-Semitism, these cannot explain the 
changes in policy that occurred in this period, which were all in the direction of 
liberalisation and were all instigated by changes in German policy. However, both factors 
explain some of the continuities in British policy—in particular the facts that Britain still 
wanted to limit expenditure as far as possible, and to provide only temporary asylum in 
Britain before the refugees were sent to permanent homes overseas. 
 
In this period, the press, public opinion and voluntary organisations tended to align more 
strongly with the humanitarian cause, which was correspondingly strengthened. All this 
happened as a reaction to Germany’s actions, or to appeasing actions that were a response 
to German threats. So the press, public opinion, voluntary organisations and 
humanitarianism were very important in this period. However, they owed this boost in 
their importance to Germany’s actions, which created great (and guilty) sympathy for the 
Czechs and created for the Jews who suffered so terribly as a result of the “Kristallnacht” 
outrages and escalating persecution in Germany and Austria. In other words, the press, 
public opinion and voluntary organisations were important as influences on policy, but 
the more pro-refugee stand that they took was a response to German actions not 
something that developed independently of those actions. Similarly, the much more 
frequent expressions of humanitarian sympathy for refugees that were heard in this period 
did not develop independently, but were a response to German actions.            
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Chapter 4 
National security versus humanitarianism 
 
From the invasion of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939, concerns with national 
security had become increasingly important to the British government. With the outbreak 
of war in September 1939 and the German invasion of Western Europe in April/May 
1940, national security became paramount and played a huge role in the evolution and 
implementation of refugee policy. This chapter covers the period beginning in September 
1939 until the settlement of refugee policy in July 1940 with the publication of a White 
Paper detailing categories eligible for release from the internment camps. It will focus on 
three key questions. What factors influenced the evolution and implementation of British 
policy to refugees? In what ways did these factors influence British policy? And what 
were the relative strengths of these factors during the period September 1939 to July 
1940? Instead of being ordered around international events like the previous, this chapter 
will focus on five key issues that affected refugee policy during this period.  
 
 
Solving the refugee problem by eradicating its cause 
 
The outbreak of war put an end to any need to appease or negotiate with Germany on the 
refugee question. From September 1939, the British government’s guiding principle was 
very simple: Britain’s contribution to solving the refugee problem would be to eradicate 
its cause—Nazi Germany itself. The government made its position clear on 25 September 
1939 when the Cabinet Committee, established to deal with the refugee problem, 
announced that from now on Britain’s contribution to the refugee problem would be to 
concentrate her energy “upon the eradication of the root cause of the refugee problem … 
namely the existing regime in Germany”.234 Government officials suspected that the 
Germans would only allow refugees to immigrate who would be “persons whose entry 
into other countries was desired for reasons connected to the war”. Consequently, Britain 
could not “‘assist in any way’ the exodus of enemy nationals nor could it admit persons 
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who had been in German-controlled territory subsequent to the outbreak of war, even 
should they later reach neutral territory.”235 This was the argument used to justify the 
government’s refusal to let large numbers of refugees from the Reich into Britain or to 
help those suffering in concentration camps in Europe.  
 
Nevertheless, in the period before the German invasion of Western Europe, the 
government did grant some visas in neutral territory to certain categories of alien 
refugees, even if they had left enemy territory after the outbreak of war. This policy was 
not publicised from late 1939 onwards. Louise London reveals that in April 1940 “the 
Home Office published details of categories of family members eligible to join close 
relatives in the United Kingdom provided there was no risk to public funds: wives joining 
husbands; minor children joining parents or a sole surviving parent, or, in the case of 
orphans, other close relatives; and, in very exceptional circumstances, elderly mothers 
without relatives abroad joining children”.236 However, the German advance westwards 
led to a severe tightening up of these categories and entry became confined to cases of 
children joining parents. By the winter of 1940-41 the Home Office and security services 
had implemented a policy of refusing to admit any more refugees.237 Despite this, no 
refugee who reached Britain was denied asylum or returned to Europe. 
 
After the outbreak of war, the British gave up on negotiating with Germany and they 
would not allow the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees to negotiate either. When 
war broke out the Rublee Plan became invalid, having achieved nothing. British 
government ministers wanted the IGCR’s wartime role to be confined to encouraging the 
re-emigration of refugees who had found temporary asylum prior to the outbreak of 
war.238 If the IGCR proposed to do anything additional the British government would 
withdraw. The government assumed that the IGCR would be left in a state of semi-
suspension for the duration of the war.239  
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Now that there was no question of negotiating with Germany, the British government felt 
no need restrain criticism about the treatment of Jews and other persecuted nationalities. 
The publication of the White Paper on the Treatment of German Nationals in Germany240 
finally made public the horrors endured by the victims of Nazism. This was the only time 
when the British government issued a statement designed to excite sympathy with the 
German victims of Nazism. It is significant that the statement was withheld until after the 
outbreak of the war. By then the British were no longer worried about the state of the 
Anglo-German relationship or of offending the Nazi regime but by this stage nothing 
more could be done to rescue the victims of the atrocities described.241 
 
 
Allied nationals: refugees from Belgium and the Netherlands 
 
The outbreak of war led to a liberalisation of policy towards some refugees: Britain 
welcomed refugees from countries that were fighting Germany. When Belgium and the 
Netherlands were attacked in April 1940 the government declared that it would accept up 
to 300,000 refugees from these countries. Official arrangements were made “to receive in 
this country up to 300,000 Dutch and Belgians … after the invasion of these countries has 
taken place”.242 The plight of these war refugees was discussed in “news reels, 
photographs, and the dispatches of war correspondence”.243 The Manchester Guardian 
cited the arrangements being made for Dutch and Belgian refugees and appeals for 
clothing and offers of accommodation. These refugees:  
 would go first to a central receiving depot, where a medical officer would be in 
 attendance. They would then be moved to provisional billets in public halls and 
 club premises … finally they would be transferred as soon as possible to the 
 private houses whose occupiers had volunteered to receive them.244  
Manchester was asked to prepare for 5,000 refugees.  
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Only a small fraction of the expected refugees from these countries actually arrived in 
Britain and the empty places were not taken up by other refugees. Nevertheless, 300,000 
was a huge number of refugees for the government to consider allowing to enter Britain, 
especially as it is estimated that during the period 1933-1939 only 80,000 refugees in 
total had been granted asylum in Britain.245 This willingness to accept refugees from 
allied nations, irrespective of religion or race, was linked to the view that nationality was 
the most reliable indicator of loyalties in a time of war. These refugees were regarded as 
allies who could safely be admitted.   
 
 
Enemy nationals: refugees from the German Reich 
 
While the emphasis on nationality helped refugees from Britain’s allies, once war broke 
out it worked against refugees from Britain’s enemy—Germany. From September 1939, 
suspicion fell increasingly on all Germans—even Jewish ones. On 4 September 1939, Sir 
John Anderson, the Home Secretary, announced there was to be an immediate review of 
Germans and Austrians in Britain. The main task of these one-man tribunals was to 
separate enemy aliens into three categories: “A” (to be interned), “B” (exempt from 
internment but subject to certain restrictions) and “C” (exempt from internment and from 
restrictions).246 The restrictions placed on those aliens who fell into category “B” 
included not being permitted to possess certain items such as cameras, maps, arms or to 
travel more than five miles from their home without police permission.247 Some 74,000 
“enemy” aliens were examined by the tribunals, with 569 were classed in category “A”, 
6,782 in category “B” and the rest (some 66,000) in category “C”.248 These measures 
were seen for the time being as sufficient. Sir John Anderson announced in March 1940 
in the House of Commons that “the majority of Germans and Austrians in this country 
are refugees from Nazi oppression.” He went on to point out that while some 74,000 
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Germans and Austrians were registered with the police, only 1,959 were interned.249 The 
Home Secretary was reminding Members of Parliament that the vast majority were 
refugees and should be treated accordingly. A “special” tribunal was also set up to 
examine the cases of Czech refugees. These refugees were regarded as “friendly” aliens 
and were not the subject of public hostility. Consequently, their examination, which did 
not require personal attendance, was “soft-pedalled”.250   
 
The public was initially sympathetic to German and Austrian refugees because they were 
aware that they had fled the Third Reich victims of Nazi persecution. In a Mass-
Observation survey from April 1940, sympathy for German and Austrian refugees was 
repeatedly mentioned. Comments like: “You can’t help feeling sorry for the poor things”, 
“This is a free country kind of thing. They have to go somewhere” and “I feel sorry for 
them. What would it be like for us if we was to ‘ave nowhere like them” were 
common.251 A. J. P. Taylor argued that “Nazi Treatment of the Jews” before the outbreak 
of the war “did more than anything else to turn English moral feeling against 
Germany”.252 François Lafitte believed this sentiment continued until May 1940.253 
Additionally, it seems that a large section of the population was uncertain about official 
policy towards refugees, and in particular the number of refugees in Britain. The public 
was also becoming increasingly worried about the deteriorating situation in Europe. 
 
In January 1940, some newspapers, such as the Sunday Express and the Daily Sketch, 
began a campaign fanning suspicions that some refugees’ loyalty was dubious. There was 
a great deal of information in the press during the first few months of 1940 about a 
potential fifth column, enemy aliens, and internment. The press was charged with 
provoking fear and inducing panic during this period, even accusing refugees of acting as 
spies and saboteurs. In the Manchester Guardian in March 1940, there was an article 
about refugees as smoke screen for spies. It argued that:  
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 the danger in this war is that there are such a large number of so-called refugees. 
 A large percentage of them are no doubt quite genuine and perfectly harmless, but 
 it has provided the enemy with a most marvellous smoke screen for insinuating 
 enemy agents into the country.254  
 
In The Internment of Aliens, published in 1940, François Lafitte stated that generally the 
opinion of the public was friendly towards refugees until “a campaign against refugees 
which began quite suddenly in the third week of January in several newspapers”.255 This 
campaign continued in the following months but it was not until May that it gained 
support from the public and in government circles.256 
 
In addition to the anti-refugee campaign in the press, in March 1940 the government 
established revision tribunals. These tribunals were set up to review cases examined by 
the previous tribunals, especially category “C” cases that were in doubt, and to consider 
the position of refugees living in the “protected areas”.257 These tribunals ordered the 
internment of some 300 people classified in categories “B” and “C” by the former 
tribunals.258 However, after having reviewed only 25 percent of their cases, 
indiscriminate internment was implemented and the programme was abandoned. 
Contemporary scholars, Yvonne Kapp and Margaret Mynatt, were extremely critical of 
these tribunals and asked “What exactly they existed for, except as a sop to anti-refugee 
opinion in the War Office”.259   
 
By April/May 1940, there were signs that this suspicion was increasingly shared by a 
significant section of the general public. A Mass-Observation survey on public feeling 
about aliens from April 1940 stated that “it would seem that among the masses a sort of 
paranoia about this enemy in our midst exists in embryo and has recently been fanned by 
the press”.260 Tom Harrison, the author of this report and founder of Mass-Observation, 
believed it was a shortage of factual information on the alien policy and number of aliens 
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in Britain which “left a situation of vagueness and bewilderment which fulfils all the 
necessities for a work-up of feeling into something which might easily border on 
temporary hysteria”.261 This same survey concluded that many people questioned 
believed there were too many refugees in Britain, some saying “they’re getting far too 
much lately” or “Too many let in – we won’t ever get them out again”, without knowing 
the actual number of refugees in Britain.262 The campaign in the press encouraged 
feelings of paranoia and hysteria.   
 
The government was also very concerned about a potential fifth column, enemy aliens 
and internment. The House of Commons spent much time discussing these issues. Some 
members of parliament believed that the measures categorising aliens at the tribunals 
were sufficient, that the majority of Germans and Austrians is Britain were in fact 
refugees and that there was no reason why people should become hysterical about a 
potential fifth column. On the other hand, some members of the parliament shared the 
public’s fears and felt uneasy about the numbers of aliens left at large in Britain. An 
article in The Times stated that “there have been recently some signs of uneasiness even 
in the House of Commons at the number of technically enemy aliens in our midst whose 
activities are alleged to be uncontrolled”.263 Political circles were thus divided on these 
issues before the situation in Europe deteriorated in April 1940.  
 
The invasion of Denmark and Norway in April 1940, and the Low Countries and France 
in May, along with reports of a “fifth column” that had assisted in Germany’s astonishing 
victories in Western Europe increased suspicion towards “enemy” aliens and made the 
previous measures seem insufficient. These reports from the Netherlands suggested that 
the German victory could in part be explained by the subversive activities of a German 
“fifth column” which had paved the way for the advancing forces intensified mistrust and 
doubt towards enemy aliens.264 This notion was given credibility by the memorandum on 
the “Fifth Column Menace” written by Sir Neville Bland, the British Minister at The 
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Hague, which was circulated in government circles. He cited a number of examples of 
fifth column activity in the Netherlands and believed that: 
 when the signal is given, as it will scarcely fail to be when Hitler so decides, there 
 will be satellites of the monster all over the country who will at once embark on 
 widespread sabotage and attacks on civilians and the military indiscriminately. 
 We cannot afford to take this risk. All Germans and Austrians, at least, ought to be 
 interned at once.265  
 
In addition, the German occupation of the Channel ports laid Britain open to the direct 
threat of invasion.266 Thus the security of the nation was the most important concern at 
this time.    
 
The result of this anti-alien feeling was the adoption of policy of internment and 
subsequently deportation. Wholesale internment began in May 1940. Aliens and refugees 
who had been categorised in class “C” who were not seen as a threat and whose loyalty 
was not in question were interned in camps along with category “A” and “B” aliens. On 
11 May 1940, a protected area along the southern and eastern coasts was established by 
Churchill. All male aliens of German and Austrian nationality between the ages of 
sixteen to sixty living in this area were rounded up and interned.267 Five days later, this 
was extended to “all enemy aliens, both male and female, between the ages 16 and 70” 
throughout the country. The majority of internees were taken to a series of camps on the 
Isle of Man. The conditions in these camps varied. Anderson’s Prisoners, published in 
1940, was a critical account of the government’s policies of internment and deportation. 
The author was said to be “Judex” but H. D. Hughes was credited with being the person 
behind it. In Anderson’s Prisoners, the worst conditions were attributed to the camp at 
Worst Mills in Bury. These conditions included “disused machinery and the floors … 
covered in filth, the buildings … infested with rats and bugs”.268 Internees were housed 
in tents, houses, and sometimes premises such as stables and factories. In Hutchinson
Camp internees set up a camp university called the “University of Liberal Arts” and a 
s 
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technical school to teach fellow internees.269 There were numerous criticisms from 
internees and advocates which include the mixing of anti-Nazi refugees with Nazis and 
Fascists in the same camps, the lack of communications internees had with family and 
friends, the separation of husbands and wives, and the internment of the elderly and 
infirm. However, the main criticism by internees was that they were forced to remain idle 
and were not allowed to help in the war effort.  
 
About 8,000 internees were then deported to Canada and Australia in terrible conditions. 
Internees on the Dunera troopship faced especially horrific conditions. The ship left 
Liverpool and journeyed to Melbourne and Sydney and the voyage lasted two months. 
When internees embarked the Dunera they had their luggage and personal items searched 
and belongings taken off them by the crew. Ronald Stent came to Britain as a refugee 
from Berlin in 1934. He was interned on the Island of Man and he was released to enlist 
in the Pioneer Corps. After the war, in which he gained a commission and ended up on 
the GHQ India, he studied history and became a lecturer. Stent described how prisoners 
were then sent down to the bottom of the ship where they were shut up in the holds in 
appalling conditions:  
 these long dark and cavernous holds were bare of everything except for a few 
 benches and some trestle tables. Eventually they were supplied some hammocks, 
 but there were only enough of them for the elderly and for the invalids; the great 
 majority throughout the eight weeks journey slept either on the tables or benches 
 or on straw palliasses on the floor.270  
 
Ablutions proved difficult, water mostly came from the sea, soap was rarely available and 
internees had had toothbrushes, shaving kits, and changes of clothes taken off them on 
embarkation.271 When these internees arrived in Australia they were “physically and 
mentally exhausted”, then “Beaten and sworn-at” as they left the ship.272    
 
The policies of indiscriminate internment and deportations were very controversial 
amongst the general public and in government circles. Members of the public wrote 
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hundreds of letters to the editor, variously expressing either support for general 
internment273 or advocating more lenient policies.274 A majority of these letters wanted a 
review of the internment and deportation policy. One was by Gilbert Murray who 
believed “much of the deplorable mismanagement of the refugee question is due to haste 
and lack of thought”. While he believed that this could “be excused in a nation faced by 
imminent peril”, he urged his compatriots not to “become so blinded by the emotions of 
war as to be unable to distinguish between friends and enemies”275. Others called for a 
complete reversal of policy.276 The House of Commons spent much time discussing these 
issues and even allocated time for discussion in two adjournment debates in July and 
August 1940.277 In these debates, it was not indiscriminate internment itself that was 
criticised but the way it was carried out. Members of Parliament repeatedly stated that 
they believed it was right that the safety of the nation should come first and that they 
were not questioning the policy of internment but instead the way it was implemented.278 
Several Members of Parliament mentioned that the policies of internment and deportation 
had “done us great harm in the eyes if some Americans”.279   
 
The real turning-point in attitudes to internment came in July 1940 as a result of the 
Arandora Star catastrophe. This liner sailed for Canada on 30 June 1940 with 
approximately 1,100 “enemy” aliens onboard. The estimates of those onboard and who 
they actually were varies as no accurate list seems to have survived. The Arandora Star 
was hit by a German torpedo and sank off the west coast of Ireland on 2 July 1940. Over 
650 internees drowned and there were numerous allegations of anti-Nazi and anti-Fascist 
refugees having been mistakenly selected for deportation.280 This disaster provoked 
outspoken criticism of the internment and deportation policy by the press and the public 
and in Parliament. A swift reversal of policy was implemented. The government set up 
two bodies: the Lytton Committee and the Asquith Committee. The Lytton Committee 
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pressed for a quick reversal of the general internment policy and its report was published 
as a White Paper at the end of July.281 The White Paper specified certain classes who 
were eligible for release, they included: 
 persons under 16 and over 70 years of age; the invalid or the infirm; persons who 
 occupied key positions in industries engaged in work of national importance; 
 scientists, research workers and persons of academic distinction for whom work 
 of national importance in their special fields in available; doctors of medicine and 
 dentists; internees who are accepted for enlistment in the Auxiliary Military 
 Pioneer Corps; persons about to embark for emigration overseas; and special 
 cases of extreme hardship, e.g. where a parent, wife or child is dangerously ill.282 
 
Deportations also ceased. Most internees seeking freedom had to prove not only that they 
were not a threat to security but also that they could help in the war effort, whether that 
took the form of being engaged in work of “national importance” or enlisting. The White 
Paper also made it clear that the release of persons within any category could be refused 
on grounds of security.283 Releases were slow and this was criticised. By August 1941 
only approximately 1,300 refugees were still interned in Britain and in 1941 some 
deportees were permitted to return to Britain.284 Although some policies took time to be 
implemented, July 1940 saw the last significant change in refugee policy.  
 
The reversal in policy was due to combination of factors. The policies of wholesale 
internment and deportation were controversial to begin with. When the public and 
members of parliament learnt about the hasty way in which policy was implemented, the 
horrific conditions in the camps, the disastrous deportations, and the sinking of the 
Arandora Star liner there was an outcry for a change of policy. John Maynard Keyes 
claimed he had “not met a single soul, inside or outside government departments, who is 
not furious at what is going on”. Several civil servants also helped François Lafitte 
compile his condemnatory study, The Internment of Aliens.285 Some members of 
parliament were also concerned about the impact these policies would have on their 
prestige and were especially anxious about American criticism of these policies. But it 
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was public outcry and genuine remorse in government circles that pressed for the u-turn 
in policy.    
 
The period September 1939 to July 1940, then, saw two major changes implemented for 
refugees from the German Reich. The first change of policy (internment and deportation) 
was brought about by “international events” in the context of an overriding concern for 
national security brought about by the Nazi invasion of Western Europe. However, the 
second change was a result of domestic criticism, genuine remorse and fear of losing 
American sympathy. 
 
 
Employment of refugees 
 
With the outbreak of war, restrictions on the employment of refugees were initially 
removed. The order forbidding aliens to work was revoked in November 1939 which 
resulted in the employment of some 17,000 refugees between that date and May 1940.286 
The order applied only to refugees who had been classified by the tribunals as category 
“C” (exempt from internment and from restrictions) and to Czech refugees.287 The 
decision to allow selected refugees to work was probably due to two concerns. First the 
economic situation was greatly improved and there was no longer an unemployment 
problem. On the contrary, there was a labour shortage caused by mobilisation which 
refugee labour could help to alleviate. By freeing British workers to enlist or work in war 
industries, refugee workers assisted in the war effort. Second, by November the 
government was aware of the dire financial situation of the voluntary organisations, and it 
most likely hoped that by allowing refugees to work it would take some of the strain off 
these organisations. Moreover, in December the government committed public funds to 
the maintenance of refugees, and if some refugees were self-supporting then there would 
be fewer people that the state would have to maintain.  
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Many members of the general public were more concerned about labour market 
competition than security. In a Mass-Observation survey of April 1940 economic issues 
were a chief concern. Those questioned about their feelings towards aliens said things 
like “I think as they’re getting jobs underhanded”, “There’s too many. We must look to 
our own unemployed first” and “They’re taking our men’s jobs away from them”.288 
None of the people questioned were worried about security concerns in regards to aliens 
working, instead they were anxious about them taking British jobs. 
 
The politicians, however, were worried about security and it was this concern that 
motivated the re-imposition of restrictions in July 1940. It is strange that restrictions on 
employment were not reintroduced until July 1940 when wholesale internment had begun 
in May 1940. Perhaps this was due to the fact that the policy of general internment was 
implemented hastily and it was in July when releases had begun that officials considered 
employment of aliens and decided that they would pose a security concern hence the re-
imposition of the order forbidding aliens to work. While pre-war restrictions had been 
driven by self-interested pressure groups that feared competition, economic issues, and 
by worries about arousing anti-refugee feeling, the re-imposition of restrictions in 1940 
was driven by security concerns on the part of the government. Security concerns were 
paramount at this time. The government was deeply concerned about aliens being 
employed in protected areas, near air fields and ammunition plants, and as domestic 
servants for military personal.289 For instance, in March 1940, Sir Gifford Fox asked in 
the House of Commons whether “any enemy aliens are employed in military hospitals in 
this country”.290 Members of Parliament felt that for security reasons restrictions 
forbidding aliens from working needed to be re-imposed due to Germany’s victories in 
Europe and the threat of a German invasion of Britain.  
 
The outbreak of war led to restrictions on the employment of aliens being removed due to 
a labour shortage and the hope of making refugees self-supporting but eight months later 
the government felt bound to re-impose these restrictions. After the catastrophic defeats 
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that followed Hitler’s invasion of Western Europe in April 1940, the British 
government’s overwhelming concern was for the security of Britain and this trumped all 
economic issues, including public concerns over labour market competition.     
 
 
Palestine 
 
At the very least, the outbreak of war reinforced the May 1939 White Paper’s decision to 
rule out the use of Palestine as a solution to the Jewish refugee problem. Despite its 
controversial nature, the 1939 White Paper remained the basis for the British 
government’s policy on Palestine throughout the war. During this period, the British 
government once more tried to conciliate the interests of Zionist Jews, Palestinian Arabs, 
and various Arab states. However, the need for Arab cooperation during the war tilted 
government policy towards the Arabs, ruling out a “Palestinian solution” to the refugee 
problem while the conflict lasted. As indeed it had since the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
when it was made clear that war was likely in March 1939. Bernard Wasserstein argues 
the White Paper was “intended to ‘appease’ the Arab population in Palestine, and thereby 
to help prevent outbreaks of anti-British feeling in the Middle East at a time when Britain 
could ill afford to keep large numbers of troops there for internal security duties”.291 The 
British managed to achieve a degree of calm in the Middle East during this period. 
Discontent in Egypt was contained and the anti-British coup d’état in Iraq was repressed. 
By the spring of 1939, the Palestinian Arab Revolt had been crushed and the White Paper 
had achieved the assent of some nationalists. Furthermore, the Arab nationalists in 
Palestine were in a state of disarray by this time.292 In Palestine, the British were 
confronted with the problem of gaining the loyalty of the nationalist Palestinian leaders—
or at least rendering them neutral for the duration of the war—without alienating the Arab 
opposition or causing the Jews to rebel. From the outbreak of war until October 1942, the 
Britain solved this problem by keeping the Arab nationalists in disarray and by rigidly 
adhering to the White Paper’s immigration and land provisions which placated the 
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nationalist Palestinian population. British officials abandoned the projected constitutional 
reform in Palestine so as to pacify the Jews.293 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
From the invasion of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939, concerns with national 
security had become increasingly important in refugee policy. With the outbreak of war, 
they acquired an overriding importance in nearly every decision pertaining to refugee 
policy; this was especially accurate after the invasion of Western Europe in April/May 
1940. This means that the international context that influenced refugee policy was greatly 
simplified. It also means that the complex values and assumptions that guided the 
response to changes in the international context were also greatly simplified. Many 
values and assumptions continued to be relevant to decisions on refugees, but almost 
every one of them was subordinated to and structured by the imperative of national 
survival. Public opinion continued to influence the government’s decisions regarding 
refugees, especially with respect to internment and deportation policies, but public 
opinion was obsessed with questions of national security and the winning of the war. The 
internment and deportation policies were overturned because of public outcry and moral 
concern on the part of the government but the classes of internees who were released 
were carefully vetted so they did not pose a threat to security and the termination of the 
deportation policy likewise was not a threat to security. Moral concerns and public 
pressure had driven the government to look more closely at what national security 
required, then modify its stance accordingly. So morality played a part, but not at any 
significant expense to national security. Humanitarian sentiment was still an influence, 
but when it conflicted with security considerations it usually took second place. This was 
because members of the British public knew that a victory for Hitler meant death to every 
humanitarian cause they believed in. Economic considerations continued to influence 
debates about whether to let German and Austrian aliens work, but decisions on this issue 
now hinged principally on a judgement about whether their contribution to the war effort 
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would outweigh the possibility that some of them would sabotage production or pass 
information on to German spies. Keeping government expenditure on refugees to a 
minimum remained important, but not nearly as important as national security. The 
government therefore committed itself to the costly exercise of internment. Arab views 
continued to influence British policy on Palestine, as they had since the dismemberment 
of Czechoslovakia. However, we have seen that this was because, in the second and third 
periods, Britain desperately needed Arab cooperation if it were to prevent the Middle 
East’s oil supplies from falling into German hands. These points all indicate elements of 
continuity in the influence on British decision-making about refugee issues. Nonetheless, 
these influences no longer operated relatively independently of national security issues as 
they had in pre-war times. They were now informed by the imperative of national 
survival and they operated within limits that it set.  
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Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this dissertation was to identify the key factors that drove British refugee 
policy in the period March 1938 to July 1940, and to evaluate their relative significance 
over time. I divided the period of study into three phases (March-September 1938, 
October 1938 to August 1939, September 1939 to July 1940), in order to explore how a 
range of factors varied in importance in a political and international environment that was 
rapidly changing. Having looked in turn at the significance of these factors during each of 
the three phases, I will now venture to make some general observations about the overall 
impact on British refugee policy of foreign policy, economic concerns, domestic British 
politics, and humanitarianism. 
  
There can be little doubt that, during the whole of the period between the Anschluss and 
the summer of 1940, the primary influence on the formation and implementation of 
British refugee policy was the international situation. Developments on the international 
stage were the motor that drove British refugee policy. It was above all as a result of 
events in Central and East-Central Europe that the refugee crisis existed in the first place. 
In considering how to respond to the refugee crisis, the British government was hugely 
influenced by concerns over its relations with other countries. However, though refugee 
policy was the handmaiden of foreign policy, it was not its slave. Foreign policy did not 
by itself dictate the precise form taken by British refugee policy. The response of the 
British government to the refugee crisis was modulated by economic concerns, domestic 
political factors, humanitarianism, and by the habits, traditions and assumptions of British 
political culture.  
 
Of fundamental importance was Britain's relationship with Germany. The evolution of 
refugee policy broadly reflected the rise and fall of appeasement. The key turning points 
of British refugee policy – the Anschluss with Austria, the annexation of the Sudetenland, 
the invasion of Bohemia and Moravia, and the outbreak of World War Two – all occurred 
as a direct result of decisions made in Berlin. Between March and September 1938, when 
appeasement was at its zenith, British policy to refugees was relatively severe and 
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unsympathetic. Continued German aggression in Central Europe, however, discredited 
appeasement and led to a worsening of Anglo-German relations. At the same time, the 
persecution of Jews and other “unwanted” groups in Germany and Austria became so 
barbaric that even the appeasers in the British government could no longer look the other 
way. As a result, the British not only became more critical of Nazi racial persecution, 
they also became increasingly sympathetic to the plight of the Nazis' victims. The 
invasion of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939 demonstrated the bankruptcy of 
appeasement and transformed the influence of the “German Question” on British refugee 
policy. Before March 1939, the overriding goal of British foreign policy was to find a 
negotiated and peaceful resolution of the diplomatic crisis in Central Europe, and refugee 
policy was formulated and implemented in the light of this prime consideration. After 
March 1939, though the British government still hoped for peace, it began to prepare for 
a war that now looked increasingly likely. The “German Question” remained important, 
but from March 1939 its importance was evaluated above all in terms of national 
security. This had a knock-on impact on refugee policy. Decisions about—for instance—
Jewish migration to Palestine, were evaluated in the light of the likely impact of those 
decisions on Britain's ability to defend itself. Once war had actually broken out in 
September 1939, the issue of national security acquired an overriding importance and 
influenced nearly every decision pertaining to refugee policy. Concerns about national 
security became even more intense after the Nazi conquest of Western Europe in April 
and May 1940. In an atmosphere of panic about an imminent invasion of Britain, a policy 
was adopted towards refugees—internment—that made no sense at all in neither 
economic nor humanitarian terms.  
 
Though the key international relationship that influenced refugee policy was with 
Germany, the British government was also aware that its refugee policy had implications 
for its relations with other foreign countries and ethnic groups. Concern about its 
relationship with the Arab world, for example, had a significant impact on the refugee 
policies of the British government. At the start of our period, the British, although tilting 
towards the Arabs, were unsure whether to favour the Arab or the Jewish view on the 
issue of Jewish migration to Palestine. With the German invasion of Bohemia and 
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Moravia, however, the security interests of the British state—above all in terms of 
Britain's access to oil—demanded peace in the Middle East and a friendly relationship 
with Arab states. As a direct consequence, British policy in Palestine became rather more 
favourable to the Arab point of view (though not to the extent that all the Arabs' 
grievances were satisfied). The relationship with the Americans, by contrast, exerted 
surprisingly little influence on British refugee policy. The British government knew that, 
if war should break out with Germany, Britain would need the support and resources of 
the United States. As a result, the British government was keen to develop the closest 
possible relationship with the Americans. That the British agreed, reluctantly, to attend 
the Evian Conference and become a member of the IGCR was largely a result of 
American pressure. On the other hand, the Americans also wanted Britain to allow large-
scale Jewish immigration into Palestine. Yet on this issue the British chose to appease 
Arab rather than American opinion. Had the Americans asserted themselves more 
vigorously on this issue, the British might well have responded differently. But so 
concerned were the Americans by the threat of Germany that—at least in private—they 
conceded that the issue of Palestine must be allowed to cast a shadow on Anglo-
American relations. 
 
Economic considerations during the period in question were not a motor of refugee 
policy, but they did significantly inform the specific responses of the British government 
to a refugee crisis that had been created by developments at the level of international 
relations. For a combination of reasons, the British government was extremely reluctant 
to fund refugee policy and it constantly strove to minimise the impact of the refugees on 
the public purse and on the British economy. First, the government was concerned that 
spending public on the refugees, or allowing refugees to work, would generate discontent 
and anti-refugee feeling amongst the British population. This concern was exacerbated by 
the difficult economic environment of the late 1930s and by the high levels of 
unemployment that still plagued many parts of Britain. The government believed the cost 
of financing refugee policy should instead be the responsibility of the voluntary 
organisations. A second reason for the government's reluctance to fund refugee policy 
was that it might set a dangerous precedent. If it became widely known that the British 
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were willing to foot the bill, the governments of Germany and of other countries might 
well respond by ratcheting up the level of persecution of their Jewish and other 
minorities. When the British government, for the first time, established a major fund to 
help refugees—the Czech Fund—British officials repeatedly stressed that the Czech 
refugees were a special case, and that the Czech Fund was a “once off” act of generosity 
that would not be repeated. In the end, however, the government was eventually 
compelled—with great reluctance—to accept a share of the burden of dealing with 
refugees from countries other than Czechoslovakia. In part this was because it proved, in 
practice, increasingly difficult to maintain the distinction between refugees from 
Germany and Austria and those from Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the huge increase in the 
numbers of refugees in the final months before the outbreak of war created a situation 
with which the Jewish and other voluntary organisations simply could not cope.  
 
Another factor that mediated the government's response to the refugee crisis was concern 
about the impact of refugee policy on the domestic political situation. At the outset of our 
period, for example, government ministers and officials were worried that allowing too 
many Jewish refugees to settle in Britain might provoke an escalation of anti-Semitism, 
which in turn might pose a threat to public order and foster the growth of extreme right-
wing political movements such as the BUF and the Nordic League. Officials used this 
fear as a reason to limit the number and types of refugees they allowed into Britain. Anti-
Semitism, or rather the government’s fear of anti-Semitism, became somewhat less 
important from “Kristallnacht”, when Germany’s true intentions concerning the Jews 
became evident. The brutality of "Kristallnacht" discredited both the Nazi government 
and organisations such as the BUF in the eyes of all but the most hardened anti-Semites. 
The vast majority of politicians, officials and members of the public, including many who 
had hitherto harboured anti-Semitic sentiments, were horrified by the bestial actions of 
the Nazis. Accordingly, it became less acceptable to express anti-Semitic views in public, 
for to do so was by implication to condone what the Nazis were doing. Once war had 
broken out, public anti-Semitism became not just “bad form”, but unpatriotic. Those most 
closely associated with anti-Semitism, such as Oswald Mosley and William Joyce, were 
now widely regarded as traitors. Though anti-Semitism did not disappear, and no doubt 
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continued to exert an influence on British policy at a covert level, it largely disappeared 
from public discourse of the refugee issue. 
 
Political debate about the refugee issue seems to have cut across party lines. There was 
no clear correlation between views on refugee issue and party affiliation. There were pro-
refugee politicians in all the major parties: Victor Cazalet was a Conservative MP, 
Norman Angell a Labour MP, Eleanor Rathbone an Independent MP, Sir John Hope 
Simpson a Liberal. It is perhaps not surprising that the refugee issue was not subordinated 
to party politics, for the refugee issue was itself in large part a component part of the 
larger controversy about appeasement. All the main parties were divided on appeasement. 
Since one’s views on the refugee issue were likely to be coloured by one’s views on 
appeasement, it follows that views on the refugee issue were equally divided. One 
possibility is that the more hostile somebody was to appeasement, the more likely they 
were to favour a more generous refugee policy. But this was not always the case; Victor 
Cazalet was an advocate of a more liberal refugee policy and a supporter of 
appeasement.294 After the outbreak of war, as before, no party wanted to be obviously 
anti-humanitarian. At the same time, no party wanted to be seen as indifferent to the 
security issues raised by the presence of German nationals in Britain. So the tension 
between humanitarianism and national security, which was the key to understanding 
refugee policy during the war, was felt keenly in all parties. 
 
Another domestic political factor that exerted an influence on refugee policy was public 
opinion, in particular as mediated through press opinion and the lobbying of pressure 
groups. Public opinion, however, could cut both ways. For instance some pressure groups 
wanted a more lenient immigration policy, while others a more restrictive policy. Press 
opinion could swing from being extremely sympathetic to the plight of refugees to 
hostile, and then to sympathetic again. This can be seen in the compassionate response to 
“Kristallnacht”, the panic over the “fifth column” scare in 1940 and then the backlash 
against internment. 
 
                                                 
294 H. Matthew and B. Harrison, vol. 10, p. 711. 
  92  
Unlike anti-Semitism, the importance of humanitarianism increased during the period 
March 1938 to July 1940. At first, humanitarianism took the form of a latent British 
tradition of welcoming refugees. But there was a contradiction between policy and 
discourse. Government discourse on refugees referred to Britain’s refugee policy as being 
humanitarian, whereas in practise policy was relatively severe and unsympathetic to 
refugees. At the Evian Conference, for instance, the government claimed that 
humanitarian considerations had led it to adopt an even more liberal policy, yet no 
additions to the previous categories for admission were offered. While Britain had a 
tradition of welcoming refugees, the government believed it was not its place to get 
involved in internal matters of other nations or to fund refugees. This was not because 
government ministers and officials were unsympathetic at an individual level to the plight 
of refugees. But, during the 1930s and early 1940s, intervention for purely humanitarian 
reasons did not occur. Yet from “Kristallnacht” refugees were admitted to Britain for 
purely humanitarian reasons. With the outbreak of war, when national security acquired 
an overriding importance in nearly every decision pertaining to refugee policy, 
humanitarian sentiment was the only factor that challenged the supremacy of national 
security. The internment and deportation policies were overturned because of moral 
concern on the behalf of both the public and government. The classes of internees who 
were released were carefully vetted so they did not pose a threat to security and the 
termination of the deportation policy likewise was not a threat to security. But it was 
humanitarian concern that drove the government to look more closely at what national 
security required, then modify its stance accordingly. It was not until after the conclusion 
of World War Two and knowledge of Holocaust, according to Claudena Skran, that 
human rights received “widespread recognition as a legitimate international concern”. 
“Before then a government’s treatment of its citizens within its own territory was deemed 
to be purely a domestic affair.”295  
 
The British government had little experience of dealing with the kind of refugee crisis 
generated by the Nazis. The initial British responses were governed by the traditions and 
political culture inherited from the past, and with a traditional focus on bilateral foreign 
                                                 
295 Skran, p. 8.  
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relations—in this case with Germany. However, British policy was beset from the outset 
by a series of fundamental contradictions. The British government insisted that the 
refugees could not be a burden on the public purse, yet it also—by preventing the 
refugees from taking up employment—denied them of the means of supporting 
themselves. The government claimed to be blind, in its refugee policy, to issues of race 
and religion, but in reality it made the Jewish organisations a cornerstone of refugee 
policy and it was clear in public discourse that everybody knew that the refugee crisis had 
a strong racial aspect. The government—for political purposes—used the language of 
humanitarianism and harped on the British tradition of welcoming refugees, whilst at the 
same time arguing that humanitarianism should not dictate refugee policy.  
 
To a degree, the story of the evolution of refugee policy in the period 1938-40 is the story 
of the problems caused by these contradictions and the way these contradictions were—at 
least partially—resolved. By the end of this period, the government had accepted a 
degree of responsibility for providing economic support to refugees, it had accepted to a 
greater degree the racialised nature of the refugee crisis (for example the internment of 
Jewish Germans implied they were seen first as Germans and only then as Jews; their 
subsequent release implied the opposite), and it had accepted, at least to a degree, that 
government did have a humanitarian responsibility to refugees. 
 
In addition to being internally inconsistent, refugee policy was formulated and 
implemented under the influence of a range of external forces (relations with Germany, 
the countries of East-Central Europe, the Arabs, the Americans, domestic political 
pressures). Some of these pushed government towards a harsher stance. Some of these 
pulled refugee policy towards greater lenience. Precisely because government was unsure 
how to respond to an unprecedented situation, and because government policy was in 
itself inconsistent, refugee policy between 1938 and 1940 was susceptible to outside 
pressures, and vacillated like a boat being pushed in one direction by the wind and in 
another direction by the current.  
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To a degree, the story of the evolution of refugee policy is the story of how these outside 
pressures on refugee policy became simplified by the dynamic of international and 
domestic developments. Pleasing the Nazis became far less important after March 1939 
and irrelevant after September 1939. Concerns about East-Central Europe were no longer 
relevant once the Germans had established a decisive domination of the region. Concerns 
about the Americans became—ironically—rather less important in terms of refugee 
policy, primarily because the Americans themselves were becoming increasingly focused 
on events in Europe than events in Palestine. Concerns about the impact of admitting 
refugees on anti-Semitism became less pronounced because public anti-Semitism became 
less socially acceptable. Concerns about the popularity of British fascism became less 
once Mosley and his colleges discredited themselves and once the BUF had been broken 
by internment. Concerns about the impact of refugees on unemployment became less and 
less relevant as unemployment decreased (in part as a result of rearmament) during the 
later period of this study, and disappeared altogether during the war. Even the 
government concern about the impact of refugees on the public purse became less 
relevant once the government had been compelled—albeit reluctantly—to shoulder a 
degree of financial responsibility. 
  
As a result of this process of simplification, by the third period of this study there were 
only two players left in the game—national security and humanitarianism. Though the 
former was dominant (the policy of indiscriminate internment is an example of this) it 
was not all powerful (this can be seen in the relaxation of internment). Perhaps this 
reflected the nature of the war itself, which the British the government fought in the name 
of universal values of freedom and human rights. One of the greatest weapons of the 
British in the war was their sense that they occupied the moral high ground. Being horrid 
to refugees, the victims of the very evil they were fighting, would have been inconsistent 
with the moralistic tone of the British discourse of war.  
 
The period 1938-40 had a substantial significance in the overall evolution of British 
refugee policy. Nowadays government has a humanitarian responsibility to victims of 
persecution that transcends their race, religion, nationality and political affiliations. In the 
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sixteenth century the British had admitted Huguenots because of their Protestant religion, 
French refugees in the 1790s because they were enemies of the Revolution, and Belgians 
in World War One because they were members of an allied nationality. But Jews were 
admitted not because of their religion, political affiliation, or nationality but despite their 
religion (Britain had strong anti-Semitic trends), their political affiliations (many refugees 
were Social Democrats and Communists) and nationality (many were Germans).  
Because of its humanitarian responsibility, government also has a responsibility—if 
necessary—to provide economic assistance to refugees. 
 
Dealing with refugee issues necessitates a multilateral response. The British were most 
reluctant to get involved in Evian and the IGCR, fearing it would erode the autonomy of 
British refugee policy. They only got involved because of American pressure. But their 
very involvement established a precedent, and paved the way for the subsequent 
acceptance of the key role of organisations such as the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees in dealing with refugee issues. 
 
Another key feature of the way governments deal with refugee issues today that was 
prefigured in the period 1938-40 is the importance of domestic political considerations. 
Then, as now, public and press opinion could cut both ways. There are two types of 
discourse of refugees: anti-refugee discourse that describes refugees as a mass, sees them 
as a threat, perhaps as a Fifth Column, and uses terms such as “swarm”, “wave”, 
“swamped”; the second type is pro-refugee discourse that focuses on the sufferings of 
refugees as human beings just like us, their helplessness, often with a focus on the 
miserable circumstances of individual refugees. Both types of discourse were clearly 
visible in the period 1938-40. 
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